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This Article uses the jurisprudential dichotomy between
two opposing types of legal requirements-"rules" and
"standards"-to examine extraterritorial regulation by the
United States. It argues that there is natural push toward
standards in extraterritorial regulation because numerous
institutional actors either see standards as the best option in
extraterritorial regulation or accept standards as a second-best
option when their first choice (a rule favorable to their interests
or their worldview) is not feasible.
The Article explores several reasons for this push toward
standards, including: statutory text, statutory interpretation
theories, the nonbinary nature of the domestic/foreign
characterization, the tendency of extraterritorial regulation to
favor plaintiffs, interest-group pressures, and interbranch
struggles within the federal government.
Since it appears standards are here to stay, this Article
concludes by suggesting that they may have some
underappreciated benefits, at least from the perspective of a
regulating state. First, the uncertainty inherent in standards
may be a necessary consequence of regulatory schemes
permitting private civil litigants to enforce extraterritorial
statutes. Second, this inherent uncertainty may permit a state's
regulatory program to influence primary behavior abroad that
would be difficult to reach through a rule-based model.
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
Extraterritorial regulation, once an esoteric topic, is now a basic
fact of the international business environment. A company may be
incorporated in one country, listed on a stock exchange in a second
country, have offices in numerous other countries, and sell products
throughout much of the world. Each country with which the company
has a connection will likely seek to regulate some of the company's
activities within that country. However, many countries find that
they cannot reach in-country activities (such as sale of dangerous
products or monopoly pricing) without regulating out-of-country
activities (such as manufacturing processes or agreements to collude)
as well.'
Moreover, countries are almost never adequately conceptualized
as single institutional actors. 2 Within a single country, different
institutional actors are likely to have different preferences with
respect to the scope of extraterritorial regulation. 3 To the extent
different structures of legal requirements give discretionary authority
to different institutional actors, they can affect the allocation of
foreign-policy decision making within a country.
1. The United States is widely acknowledged to be an aggressive
extraterritorial regulator. While much opposition to U.S. extraterritorial regulation has
come from European countries, the European Union is now itself an important
extraterritorial regulator. China is even beginning to exercise extraterritorial
authority, though it may be hampered by a domestic regulator system that is currently
far less developed than those of the United States and Europe.
2. Even countries widely considered autocratic often have formal institutional
separations, and dictators-like everyone else-must contend with principal-agent
problems.
3. They may have different preferences both as to the scope of extraterritorial
regulation generally and the degree of extraterritorial regulation appropriate in
different substantive fields.
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The United States has long been an aggressive extraterritorial
regulator. Some federal laws provide explicit extraterritorial
authority; others have been interpreted by courts to apply outside the
United States. Many statutes permit the U.S. government to bring
extraterritorial enforcement action; a smaller but still significant
number also give private parties the ability to enforce extraterritorial
statutes through civil suits.4
Despite the importance of extraterritorial regulation to the
modern states, doctrinal accounts have proved highly unsatisfactory
in either explaining existing jurisprudence or predicting future
decisions. This Article puts traditional doctrinal tools to the side and
looks instead at the underlying structure of the legal framework that
has developed around extraterritorial regulation. The Article focuses
on one aspect of this underlying structure that has not been explored
in existing literature-the degree to which the territorial scope of a
legal requirement is structured as a "rule" or a "standard."5
The rule/standard distinction serves as a wider lens for viewing
existing case law. From this perspective, existing doctrine looks less
like a confused jumble of inconsistent decisions.6 Instead, it begins to
look more like the doctrinal consequences of a larger battle over the
form of legal requirements and the allocation of decision-making
authority within a multibranch government.7
4. See infra Part VI.D.
5. For a detailed explanation of the difference between rules and standards,
see infra Part II.A.
6. This is not to suggest these inconsistent decisions are inherently
problematic-they may to some extent be a necessary result of the Supreme Court's
institutional structure. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95
HARV. L. REV. 802, 831 (1982) (concluding, based on Arrow's Impossibility Theorem,
that the Supreme Court is institutionally incapable of avoiding logically inconsistent
decisions).
7. For examples of Supreme Court cases treating the territorial scope of
federal law as a standard, see F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S.
155, 173 (2004) (relying on comity and historical context to conclude that Congress did
not intend for the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982 to include foreign
injury-that was independent of any domestic injury-within the scope of the Sherman
Act); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797-99 (1993) (concluding that
conflict between U.S. and British insurance law was not sufficient to justify the
exercise of comity-based abstention on the particular facts); Romero v. Int'l Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959) (balancing interests to conclude that the Jones
Act did not apply to a claim by a Spanish subject against a Spanish corporation for an
injury in U.S. territorial waters); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 592 (1953)
(applying Danish law, instead of the Jones Act, after reviewing a long list of factors and
concluding that they weighed heavily in favor of Danish rather than U.S. law).
Sometimes these standards are phrased in the form of rules, but the presence of
longstanding, unresolved conflicts between nonoverruled cases in effect transforms
rules into standards. See Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953,
965 (1995) (explaining that a standard exists when you cannot know in advance how it
will be applied to particular facts).
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This Article has four primary goals. First, it suggests that the
rule/standard distinction provides a way of understanding the
manner in which the territorial scope of statutes is structured.
Second, it suggests that the statutory-interpretation battles that
dominate existing doctrine are relevant only for one type of statute-
those whose territorial scope is structured as a standard rather than
a rule. Third, it suggests that different institutional actors will have
different preferences with respect to whether the territorial scope of a
statute is set out as a rule or a standard. Fourth, it suggests that the
uncertainty inherent in standards may have some underappreciated
benefits.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II provides an overview
of the jurisprudential concepts of rules and standards. Part III
introduces three broad statutory categories: (1) extraterritorial rules,
such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), in which there is a
clear statement of extraterritorial reach; (2) territorially limited
rules, in which there is a clear statement against extraterritoriality;
and (3) potentially extraterritorial standards, in which
extraterritorial reach is uncertain. The third category, potentially
extraterritorial standards, accounts for much of the current doctrinal
confusion. Part IV explains that one way of making sense of this
confusion is to understand potentially extraterritorial standards as
being subject to three types of interpretive approaches: (1)
proextraterritoriality interpretive methods, (2) antiextraterritoriality
interpretive methods, and (3) territorially neutral interpretive
methods.8 Part V suggests that leading extraterritoriality precedents
make more sense when viewed as a struggle between rules and
standards, on the one hand, and proextraterritoriality and
antiextraterritoriality interpretive methods, on the other hand. Part
VI addresses the stability of interpretive methods over time and the
uncertainty created by standards. It suggests that differences in
interest-group pressure may make antiextraterritoriality interpretive
methods more stable than proextraterritoriality interpretive methods.
It further suggests that the uncertainty inherent in standards-based
For examples of the Supreme Court treating the territorial scope of federal law as a
rule, see EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258-59 (1991)
(purporting to apply the clear statement rule to conclude that Title VII did not apply to
a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. company in Saudi Arabia); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281, 285, 290-91 (1949) (declining to apply the Eight Hour Law to work done by a
U.S. citizen for a U.S. government contractor in Iran and Iraq, and basing the decision
on formal differences in territorial control between U.S. possessions and foreign
countries); Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1948) (applying the
Fair Labor Standards Act to an area of Bermuda leased, for ninety-nine years, from
Great Britain by the United States).
8. I use the phrase "interpretive methods" rather than "canons" here because
some of the relevant interpretive methods are general approaches to statutory
interpretation for which the term canon seems too narrow.
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regulation may have advantages in the extraterritoriality context, at
least from the perspective of an individual state. Part VII concludes.
II. "RULES" AND "STANDARDS"
This Part analyzes the jurisprudential concepts of rules and
standards. Part II.A provides an overview of the distinction between
rules and standards, using examples to illustrate the explanatory
value of this distinction. Part II.B surveys existing literature on rules
and standards. It highlights the role that the distinction between
rules and standards has played in multiple schools of academic
thought (from Critical Legal Studies to Law and Economics) and of
multiple fields of public and private law (ranging from property and
contract law to constitutional and administrative law). Part II.C
focuses on the surprising absence of academic discussion of the
distinction between rules and standards in the field of conflict of laws.
A. Overview
One helpful perspective on the rules/standard distinction is set
out in Lewis Kaplow's Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis.9 Kaplow suggests that the primary distinction between
rules and standards is that rules are legal commands that seek to
determine an outcome on a particular fact situation ex ante. 10
Standards, by contrast, seek to determine an outcome on a particular
situation ex post.'"
In other words, when faced with a legal requirement structured
as a rule, an individual or entity should be able to predict with
significant accuracy the outcome of a particular fact situation. By
contrast, an individual facing a legal requirement structured as a
standard is unlikely to know what outcome the decision maker will
reach in a nonextreme fact situation. 12
Kaplow also pointed out an aspect of the distinction between
rules and standards sometimes overlooked by earlier writers.' 3 Many
9. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557 (1992).
10. Id. at 559-60.
11. Id.
12. Extreme fact situations may be relatively clear even under a standard. Few
decision makers would doubt that driving, drunk, at eighty miles per hour down an icy,
residential street does not qualify as exercising "reasonable" care. C.f H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 130-32 (1961) (discussing potential certainty of open-textured
legal requirements in extreme fact situations).
13. See Kaplow, supra note 9, at 565-66 & n.13 (noting that some earlier
writers did not consider "the level of detail actually employed by the adjudicator"
(emphasis omitted)).
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earlier writers identified rules with simple legal requirements and
standards with complex legal requirements.14 Kaplow observed that
this did not accurately capture the full range of rules and standards,
which both exist in simple and complex forms.15
1. Rules
A speed limit of, say, fifty-five miles per hour provides a classic
example of a simple rule. In its pure form, the rule is highly
predictable. If a car is going more than fifty-five miles per hour, then
it violates the rule regardless of any extenuating circumstances.1 6 It
does not matter if the driver is late for an important meeting, rushing
an injured person to the hospital, or driving in a manner that is
entirely safe given the visibility and weather conditions. A simple
rule makes a law predictable, but may lead to unfair results in
particular fact situations.
The addition of a school zone transforms the rule into one that is
slightly more complex. The rule could take the form of a forty miles-
per-hour speed limit most of the time, but with the limit reduced to
twenty-five miles per hour during school hours. This would have a
similar degree of predictability as the simple, fifty-five miles-per-hour
rule. But, it has the possibility of being more appropriately tailored to
particular fact situations. Individuals may drive no faster than
14. See id. at 565 n.13 (collecting sources).
15. See id. at 566 ("Thus, there are simple and complex rules as well as simple
and complex standards.").
16. While the rule is expressed here in its simplest form, it is worth noting that
many (perhaps most) real-world speed limits are a combination of a simple rule and a
simple standard. The rule portion sets a maximum limit on the speed at which vehicles
may travel. The standard portion provides that a person can be cited for traveling at a
speed that is unsafe under the circumstances, even if that speed is below the posted
speed limit. For example, § 11-801(A) of Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes states:
Any person driving a vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a
careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and
proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the highway and
any other conditions then existing. No person shall drive any vehicle upon a
highway at a speed greater than will permit the driver to bring it to a stop
within the assured clear distance ahead.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 § 11-801(A) (2007). Section 11-801(B) indicates:
Except when a special hazard exists that requires lower speed for
compliance with subsection A of this section, the limits specified by law or
established as hereinafter authorized shall be maximum lawful speeds, and no
person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed in excess of the following
maximum limits . ...
Id. § 11-801(B). See also Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance of Action, in
PHILOSOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 58, 59-62 (Andrei Marmor &
Scott Soames eds., 2011) (examining a 1917 decision of the Ohio Supreme Court
involving a combination of rule-like and standard-like speeding statutes).
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twenty-five miles per hour during those times when schoolchildren
are expected to be present, but at other times may drive no faster
than forty miles per hour.
By contrast, the U.S. Tax Code sits on the far end of the simple-
to-complex rule spectrum. While the U.S. Tax Code contains some
embedded standards,' 7 it is largely a complex, rules-based regulatory
regime. It seeks to specify ex ante how the tax laws will apply to a
particular fact situation and to eliminate, to the degree possible,
individual discretion. Beneath its formidable complexity is an
attempt to specify outcomes with a degree of precision that no
standard can accomplish.
2. Standards
An example of a simple standard would be a general
reasonableness requirement applied to a simple fact situation. It
could take the form of requiring individuals to drive at a reasonable
speed on a particular stretch of road, with reasonableness determined
by the totality of the factual circumstances. The standard would not
attempt to specify what facts should be considered or their relative
priority.
A slightly more complicated standard could take the form of a
requirement that drivers proceed at a reasonable speed given the
weather conditions and time of day. This slightly more complex
standard still relies on the basic criterion of reasonableness, but
incorporates two specific aspects of the fact situation that the decision
maker should consider in reaching a decision.
A still more complex standard could incorporate a
nonexhaustive, multifactor balancing test. Examples include the
public-interest and private-interest factors used in forum non
conveniens analysis, 18 § 145 (the basic torts provision) of the
17. One example of a standard embedded in the tax code is the economic
substance doctrine now codified as 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (Supp. V 2011).
18. The forum non conveniens analysis requires a federal trial court to balance
competing private-interest factors. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 253, 255-56
(1981). The trial court's balancing of these factors is to be overturned only for abuse of
discretion. Id.
The private-interest factors courts must consider include: "relative ease of access to
sources of proof," "availability of compulsory process," "possibility [if appropriate] of
view of premises," "enforcibility of a judgment," and "all other ... problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive." Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
508 (1947). Courts are instructed to "weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair
trial." Id. The public-interest factors courts must consider include: "[a]dministrative
difficulties [that] follow . . . when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of
being handled at its origin," the burden of jury duty "upon the people of a community
which has no relation to the litigation," the benefits of "holding trial in the[] view and
reach" of affected persons, the "local interest in having localized controversies decided
at home," and the "appropriateness ... [of] having the trial of a diversity case in a
178 [VOL. 46:171
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Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,' 9 and-most relevant for
our purposes-the reasonableness factors set out in § 403 of the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States.20
forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having
a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to
itself." Id. at 508-09.
19. The basic torts provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
provides:
§ 145. The General Principle
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has
the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987). Section 403(2) provides:
Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation
is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted.
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. § 403(2).
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Figure 1, below, illustrates the relationship between the
rule/standard distinction and the simple/complex distinction. This
Article sets each out as a spectrum, rather than a binary decision,
because of the various intermediate options between the two
extremes. The rule/standard distinction forms the horizontal axis,
with pure rules on the far left and pure standards on the far right.
The simple/complex distinction forms the vertical axis, with simple
requirements (those involving the analysis of a few factors) at the top
and complex requirements (those involving the analysis of many
factors) at the bottom.
The intersection of the rule/standard spectrum and the
simple/complex spectrum results in four quadrants. The upper-left
quadrant contains simple rules. Moving clockwise, the upper-right
quadrant shows simple requirements structured as standards rather
than rules. The bottom-right quadrant contains complex
requirements structured as standards. The bottom-left quadrant
contains complex requirements structured as rules. Throughout the
diagram, those examples that approximate the relevant ideal type are
closer to the outside; those requirements further from the relevant
ideal type are close to the center.
Figure 1-Examples of Typical Rules and Standards
Simple
(few factors)
Speed limit *Drive at a
55 1reasonable speed
Drive at speed
Speed limit 40 appropriate given
(but 25 during weather and time of
school hours) day Standards
Rules Standards__________________
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B. Existing Literature
Jurisprudential thinkers have long recognized that legal
commands exist along a spectrum between rules at one end and
standards at the other. Terminology for signaling these concepts has
varied over time, but rules and standards are today the most
generally recognized terms. 21 Before these became the relatively
settled terms, H.L.A. Hart referred to what we now call standards as
"open-textured" legal requirements in 1961. 22 Eight years later,
Kenneth Culp Davis wrote about the relationship between "law" and
"discretion" as forms of government decision making. 23 Judge J.
Skelly Wright, in reviewing Davis's work, spoke similarly of the
relationship between administrative "discretion" 24 and "binding,
prospective, rules."2 5
Even earlier, late nineteenth century jurisprudential views
emphasized rule-like legal requirements derived from natural law
theory. By the early twentieth century, the legal realists had
demonstrated that rule-based conceptualism did not accurately
predict the actual decisions of courts. The realists' rejection of
conceptualism had its roots in a functional jurisprudence with a
heavy focus on understanding the importance of facts, rather than
legal concepts, in predicting the actual decisions of courts.26
Modern discussion of rules and standards in legal analysis
begins with Duncan Kennedy's 1976 article, Form and Substance and
Private Law Adjudication.27 In this enormously influential article, 28
21. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 9 (using the terms rules and standards);
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976) (same); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175 (1989) (same); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (same). Margaret Jane Radin traces the use of the term
standard to Duncan Kennedy's 1976 article. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the
Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 795 n.44 (citing Kennedy, supra, at 1688). With the
more recent publication of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks's famous mimeographed-but-
unpublished teaching materials, we can now trace the use of the terms rules and
standards to signify these concepts at least to the final version of their Legal Process
materials. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 138-41 (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (using the terms rules and standards in largely the
same manner they are used in later academic discussions).
22. HART, supra note 12, at 124.
23. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3
(1969).
24. J. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 594
(1972).
25. Id. at 593.
26. LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960, at 30 (1986).
27. Kennedy, supra note 21.
1812013/
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Kennedy described rule-based decision making as being motivated by
a concern for "form" and a worldview based on "individualism."29 He
contrasted this with standards-based decision making, motivated by a
concern for "substance" and a worldview based on "altruism." 30
According to Kennedy, those whose worldview centers on self-reliance
and the legitimacy of self-interested activity will have a preference for
rules. 31 Those whose worldview privileges sacrifice, sharing, and
mercy will have a preference for standards. 32
Kennedy's article is often considered one of the early works in
the Critical Legal Studies movement. However, economically oriented
scholars soon joined in the rules-and-standards discussion.
In the area traditionally categorized as private law, the
rule/standard dichotomy has been applied as a way of understanding
the battle of the forms in contract law3 3 and judicial responses to
forfeiture doctrines in property law. 34 In the area traditionally
categorized as public law, the rule/standard dichotomy has been
applied to the appropriate level of complexity for administrative
rules;35 the Supreme Court's approach to economic regulation;36 and
the Supreme Court's approach to controversial, publicly salient,
constitutional law subjects.37 In addition to issues arising in specific
fields of substantive law, the distinction between rules and standards
has also been applied by empirical scholars38 in more philosophically
28. On the lasting influence of this article, see William Fisher, Introduction to
Duncan Kennedy, in THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 647, 650-57 (David
Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006).
29. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 1685, 1701-02.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1713.
32. Id. at 1717.
33. Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of
the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1221 (1982).
34. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577,
597-604 (1988).
35. Colin A. Diver, The Optimal Precision ofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.
65, 66 (1983).
36. Frank A. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 5-8 (1984).
37. See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 27-56 (discussing Supreme Court rulings
during the 1991 term with respect to abortion rights, the Establishment Clause, hate
speech, public forums, property rights, and federalism); see also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 943-44 (1987)
(discussing the role of standard-like balancing tests in constitutional law, without
explicitly emphasizing the rule/standard distinction); Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 380 (arguing that the rule/standard distinction
permeates many areas of law).
38. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1536-39
(2008) (demonstrating that, in voting rights cases, rule-like provisions constrained
judicial behavior more than standard-like provisions).
182 [VOL. 46:171
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oriented jurisprudential work 39 and in broader analyses of legal
policy that cross substantive fields.40
C. Rules, Standards, and the Conflict of Laws
Given the substantial attention that philosophically, critically,
and economically oriented legal thinkers have paid to the distinction
between rules and standards, it is surprising how little direct
attention it has received in the field of conflict of laws. This is not for
its lack of importance to the field.
The traditional approach to choice of law was an entirely rule-
based system. This system, set out in the First Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, sought to predict in advance the result in any
individual case. The legal realists' rejection of the First
Restatement 41 was in large part motivated by dissatisfaction with the
results produced by this rule-based theory in individual cases.
Moreover, the initial cases rejecting the traditional view appeared to
be substituting a standard of "most significant contacts" for the strict
rules of the First Restatement.42
Yet before the First Restatement could be replaced by standards,
legal academics began to develop alternative, but still rule-based,
approaches. The first and most well known of these is Brainerd
39. KARL N. LEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES 77-82 (Frederick Schauer ed.,
2011) (posthumously published manuscript); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND
IN LIFE 1-2 (1991); Jules L. Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 703, 703 (1991); Radin, supra note 21, at 795-96.
40. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 37-38
(1995) (exploring the trade-off between "simple rules" and "justice in the individual
case"); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 960-68. Sunstein breaks the spectrum of rules and
standards down into additional subcategories. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 960-68. From
most rule-like to least rule-like, he identifies "rules," "rules with excuses,"
"presumptions," "factors," "guidelines," "standards," and "untrammeled discretion" as
forms that legal requirements can take. Id. Sunstein also discusses "principles" and
"analogies," but does not appear to claim that these are additional forms that legal
requirements can take. See id. at 966-68. Instead, he appears to take the position that
principles may be one of two things. They can be "political or moral" ideas used to
justify legal requirements, in whatever format they take. Id. at 966. Alternatively, they
can be "legal principles ... brought to bear on the resolution of cases," but whose
"status is somewhat mysterious." Id.
41. This traditional approach is associated most heavily with Justice Joseph
Story, see, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN
AND DOMESTIC: IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN
REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS (1846), and
Professor Joseph Beale, see, e.g., JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1935). Beale was the reporter for the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (1934).
42. See, e.g., Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 443-44 (N.Y. 1961) (applying
Illinois law as having the "most significant contacts" and being the "center of gravity"
of the relevant relationship); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 103 (N.Y. 1954) (applying
English law as the "law of the place with the most significant contacts").
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Currie's governmental-interest analysis. 4 In its pure form,
governmental-interest analysis purports to be able to solve all conflict-
of-law problems with six simple rules. 44
Dissatisfaction with one aspect of Currie's solution to the true-
conflict problem led to the development of alternative theories. 45
William Baxter's theory of comparative impairment accepted most of
43. See BRAINERD CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws, in, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAwS 177 (1963) [hereinafter CURRIE,
Notes] (exploring the broader implications of problems in the conflict of laws); Brainerd
Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242-43 (1963) [hereinafter Currie, Comments].
44. Currie, Comments, supra note 43, at 1242. In what seems unlikely to have
been a coincidence, these six proposed rules were published in the home law review of
those responsible for drafting the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws-and were
explicitly offered as "a substitute for all that part of the Restatement dealing with
choice of law." Id. The six rules Currie proposed were the following:
§ 1. When a court is asked to apply the law of a foreign state different from the
law of the forum, it should inquire into the policies expressed in the respective
laws, and into the circumstances in which it is reasonable for the respective
states to assert an interest in the application of those policies. In making these
determinations the court should employ the ordinary processes of construction
and interpretation.
§ 2. If the court finds that one state has an interest in the application of its
policy in the circumstances of the case and the other has none, it should apply
the law of the only interested state.
§ 3. If the court finds an apparent conflict between the interests of the two
states it should reconsider. A more moderate and restrained interpretation of
the policy or interest of one state or the other may avoid conflict.
§ 4. If, upon reconsideration, the court finds that a conflict between the
legitimate interests of the two states is unavoidable, it should apply the law of
the forum.
§ 5. If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable conflict exists between the
laws of the two other states, and the court cannot with justice decline to
adjudicate the case, it should apply the law of the forum-until someone comes
along with a better idea.
§ 6. The conflict of interest between states will result in different dispositions of
the same problem, depending on where the action is brought. If with respect to
a particular problem this appears seriously to infringe a strong national
interest in uniformity of decision, the court should not attempt to improvise a
solution sacrificing the legitimate interest of its own state, but should leave to
Congress, exercising its powers under the full faith and credit clause, the
determination of which interest shall be required to yield.
Currie, Comments, supra note 43, at 1242-43. Currie's § 2 has come to be known as a
"false conflict," § 3 as an "apparent conflict," § 4 as a "true conflict," and § 5 as an
"unprovided-for case."
45. Currie's solution to true conflicts (situations where two or more states had
an interest in having their law applied, see id.) was to apply forum law. For those less
comfortable with a strong forum preference than Currie, this approach to true conflicts
was one of the most significant problems with governmental-interest analysis. See LEA
BRILMAYER ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 215 (6th ed. 2011)
(noting that many academics accepted Currie's solution to false conflicts but rejected
his solution to true conflicts).
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Currie's rules, but substituted an alternative, slightly less rule-like,
solution to the true-conflict problem. 46 Robert Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations (often described as the "better rule"
approach) proposed a far more standard-like set of factors that
incorporated the basic idea of state interests on which Currie's theory
was based.47
Yet even the most standard-like of these Currie-derived
approaches is far more rule-like than the "New York approach" and
its derivatives.4 8 By 1972, eighteen years after its first "modern"
46. William Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1,
18-22 (1963). For true-conflict cases, Baxter proposed replacing Currie's forum
preference with a requirement that the court apply the law of the state whose policy
objectives would be most harmed by a decision not to apply its law. Id. at 18. Baxter's
theory is closer to a rule than a standard because it purports to be able to determine in
an objective manner which state's interest is least impaired. See id. It is less rule-like
than Currie's theory because there is more possibility for the identity of the decision
maker to influence the outcome than under the pure version of Currie's theory.
47. See Robert Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1586-88 (1966). The five "choice influencing
considerations" Leflar identified are: "Predictability of Results," "Maintenance of
Interstate and International Order," "Simplification of the Judicial Task,"
"Advancement of the Forum's Governmental Interests," and "Application of the Better
Rule of Law." Id. at 1586-87.
48. There are two broad branches to modern choice-of-law theory. The first
branch derives from Currie's governmental-interest analysis; the second branch derives
from a series of decisions by the New York Court of Appeals.
Each theory in the Currie-derived branch derives from one or more academic
articles proposing a general solution to perceived conflict-of-law problems. See, e.g.,
Currie, Comments, supra note 43, at 1242-43 (governmental-interest analysis); Baxter,
supra note 46, at 18-22 (comparative impairment); Leflar, supra note 47, at 1586-88
(choice-influencing considerationsibetter rule). These academic solutions were only
later applied by courts to concrete fact situations. See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360
P.2d 906, 907 (Cal. 1961) (governmental-interest analysis); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,
546 P.2d 719, 723-24 (Cal. 1976) (comparative impairment); Milkovitch v. Saari, 203
N.W.2d 408, 412-17 (Minn. 1973) (choice-influencing considerations/better rule).
By contrast, the New York approach to choice of law developed case by case in a
series of appellate decisions. See generally BRILMAYER ET AL., supra note 45, at 179-93
(summarizing the evolution of choice-of-law theory in the New York Court of Appeals).
It began with two contract cases based on a standard-like grouping of contacts. Haag v.
Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 443-44 (N.Y. 1961); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-02
(N.Y. 1954). This was followed by the famous case of Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d
279 (N.Y. 1963), which began to look to state interests as well as contacts, but
continued to look at this combination of contacts and interests in a standard-like
manner. Id at 284-85.
The New York Court of Appeals began to flirt with more rule-like approaches in
later cases, with a concurring opinion in Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969),
and the majority opinion on Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972),
purporting to set out a series of rule-like requirements for guest-statute cases. But
even Neumeier's supposedly rule-like versions of the New York approach contained a
broad, standard-like exception:
In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in
different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the
applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred
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decision, 49 the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that its
choice-of-law decisions "have .. . lacked consistency"-a predictable
result of a standard-like approach to decision making.50
The Restatement (Second) incorporates an uneasy mix of Currie-
derived and New York-derived elements. Historically, this awkward
combination appears to have resulted from an initial drafting by
scholars who favored the standard-like New York approach, followed
by incorporation of Currie-derived methods after intense criticism of
the initial drafts.5 ' This combination of rule-like and standard-like
elements-in an undifferentiated and somewhat contradictory
manner-has produced a choice-of-law methodology that garners both
widespread judicial acceptance and widespread academic criticism.
It is puzzling that conflict of laws, a field so dominated by a
battle between rules and standards, has been relatively untouched by
the existing academic analyses of these concepts. The few exceptions
include a recent paper by Lea Brilmayer and Rachel Anglin on the
problems caused by "single-factor triggers" in domestic choice of law52
but not if it can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will
advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth
working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.
Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 458.
Later, the New York Court of Appeals emphasized what it saw as a distinction
between loss-allocating and conduct-regulating legal requirements, with some hints of
a return to a preference (if not a rule) for application of the law of the place of injury.
Padula v. Lilarn Props. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (N.Y. 1994); Schultz v. Boy
Scouts of Am., 480 N.E.2d 679, 686 (N.Y. 1985). Commenting on New York's more
recent cases, one leading conflict-of-laws casebook has observed:
After reading [the cases discussed in this footnote] and other New York
cases, one might conclude that New York's choice-of-law rule for torts boils
down to: Apply the law of the place of injury unless the issue involves a loss-
allocation dispute between common domiciliaries, in which case apply the law
of the domicile. If this is correct, then the New York "revolution" amounts to
nothing more than the First Restatement with a narrow exception for common
domicile cases involving loss-allocation issues . . . . [However, 1]ower appellate
courts in the state view New York's approach as more complex than the
simplistic rule suggested above.
BRILMAYER ET AL., supra note 45, at 193.
49. Auten, 124 N.E.2d at 99.
50. See Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 457 (pointing to this inconsistency in multi-
state highway accident cases).
51. See generally, William A. Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid
Method or Mishmash, 34 MERCER L. REV. 645, 655-64 (1983) (describing the drafting
history of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws).
52. See Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the
Metaphysics of the Stand-Alone Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2010) ("The
sterile character of much contemporary choice of law debate is a direct result of the fact
that conventional choice-of-law approaches are searching for something that does not
exist-a single, inherently determinative contact that, standing alone, is sufficient to
justify the application of local law."); see also BRILMAYER ET AL., supra note 45, at 193
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and the work done by Paul Stephen on the political economy of choice
of law.53 This Article begins to fill that gap by demonstrating that
many of the major disputes about the territorial scope of U.S. federal
law break down into disagreement over whether the territorial scope
statute should be set out in a rule-like or standard-like manner.
This Part began with an overview of the distinction between
rules and standards, summarized the existing literature, and closed
with a discussion of the surprising lack of analysis regarding rules
and standards in the field of conflict of laws. Part III uses the
rule/standard dichotomy as a way of understanding the territorial
scope of federal statutes. The core insight of Part III is that the
distinction between rules and standards can operate at two levels.
First, the substantive requirements of the statute can be structured
as either a rule or a standard. Second, the territorial scope of the
statute can be structured to the rule or standard. Understanding
whether the territorial scope is structured as a rule or a standard is
key to understanding subsequent judicial treatment of the statute.
III. THREE CATEGORIES OF TERRITORIAL SCOPE
This Part divides federal statutes into three categories based on
the textual information Congress provides about their territorial
scope. 54 Part III.A discusses extraterritorial rules. These are conduct-
regulating laws that contain language explicitly stating that they
(noting that development of the New York approach to choice of law "highlights the
tensions between rules and standards").
53. Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 957,
961, 966 (2002) ("Rather than global, one-size-fits-all standards such as
'reasonableness,' we need jurisdictional rules that pursue precision within the confines
of the structure and purposes of particular regulatory schemes."); see also Paul B.
Stephan, The Political Economy of Extraterritoriality 11-17 (APSA 2011 Annual
Meeting Paper), [hereinafter Stephan, Extraterritoriality] available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstractid=1900156 ("Vague Standards, the
inevitable product of judicial management of competing policy claims, invite litigation,
which lawyers like and clients do not."). There is a somewhat older conflict-of-laws
literature that in effect addresses the rule/standard distinction, but without using the
rule/standard terminology or engaging the jurisprudential work outside of the conflict-
of-laws field. See, e.g., Peter Hay, Flexibility Versus Predictability and Uniformity in
Choice of Law: Reflections on Current European and United States Conflicts Law, 226
RECUEIL DES COURS 281 (1991). For an earlier work predating modern writing on the
rule/standard distinction, see Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57
CORNELL L. REV. 315 (1972).
54. Of course, pure examples of these categories are extreme situations. There
are many gray areas in between, but many real-world laws will tend toward one of the
three.
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apply extraterritorially.5 5 Part III.B discusses territorially limited
rules. These are conduct-regulating laws that contain language
limiting their application to the territory of the regulating state. Part
III.C discusses potentially extraterritorial standards. These are
conduct-regulating laws containing general language that does not
clearly state whether the statute applies outside the United States.
Dividing the statutes into these three categories is useful for
several reasons. Extraterritorial rules and territorially limited rules
require courts to do little to determine territorial scope, as they
contain a clear statement of either extraterritoriality or
nonextraterritoriality. The categorization of many major aspects of
U.S. economic policy as extraterritorial rules explains an otherwise
curious phenomenon: the striking paucity of published appellate
decisions examining the territorial scope of some of the statutes the
U.S. government uses most aggressively to affect foreign behavior. 56
The interpretive action occurs, instead, when courts examine
those statutes that are structured as potentially extraterritorial
standards. These statutes contain no clear statement of
extraterritoriality or nonextraterritoriality, but are phrased in a
broad manner that could potentially apply worldwide. This results in
three significant consequences: (1) it makes it possible for courts to
uphold enforcement in situations that seem, ex post, to be
appropriate; (2) it makes it possible for courts to decline enforcement
in situations that seem, ex post, to be inappropriate; and (3) it creates
a penumbra of situations that are neither clearly within nor clearly
outside the statute, but which require foreign entities and individuals
to consider the possibility of enforcement.5 7
It is important to emphasize that the distinction between rules
and standards highlighted in the following subparts is solely with
respect to the geographic scope of the statute. Substantively, the legal
requirement underlying extraterritorial rules, territorially limited
rules, and potentially extraterritorial standards can be rule-like,
standard-like, or anywhere in between.
A. Extraterritorial Rules
The first category of statutes that require little judicial
involvement to determine territorial scope is the extraterritorial rule.
Numerous U.S. statutes fall into this category. These include criminal
statutes applying in the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
55. Sometimes these statutes use terms such as extraterritorial or
extraterritorially, other times they simply state that they apply to activities in foreign
countries.
56. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is one prominent example.
57. On the effects of the uncertainty created by potentially extraterritorial
standards, see infra Part VII.B.
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of the United States" (SMTJUS) and the "special aircraft jurisdiction
of the United States" (SAJUS). 58 The SMTJUS statute extends
federal versions of many traditional crimes (including assault, arson,
murder, and kidnapping) 59 to the high seas, areas outside the
jurisdiction of any state, various forms of transportation to and from
the United States, and properties used by U.S. personnel on official
business in foreign countries. 60 The SAJUS statute extends a more
limited set of criminal statutes to certain aircraft in flight.6 '
Extraterritorial rules also include explicitly extraterritorial
statutes, such as the FCPA, which criminalizes bribes to foreign
government officials to obtain or retain business; the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), which criminalizes sexual activity with
minors in foreign countries; 62 the U.S. Tax Code, which applies
explicitly to foreign-earned income of U.S. persons; and various U.S.
money laundering laws, which explicitly apply extraterritorially in
enumerated situations. 63
In all of these statutes, Congress has included an explicit
statement of extraterritorial scope and a relatively precise definition
of at least some of the conduct that will subject an individual to a
legal penalty for action taken outside the United States. When faced
with statutes structured as extraterritorial rules, the path of least
resistance is for courts to accept Congress's statement of its own
intent.
B. Territorially Limited Rules
The second category of statutes that requires little judicial
involvement to determine territorial scope is the territorially limited
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (setting out the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States); 49 U.S.C. § 46501(2) (2006) (setting out the special
aircraft jurisdiction of the United States); see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 44-45 (2007)
(listing statutes referencing the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States); id. at 45 (listing statutes referencing the special aircraft jurisdiction of
the United States).
59. See DOYLE, supra note 58, at 44-45 (listing these and other examples).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 7.
61. See 49 U.S.C. § 46501(2).
62. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 105, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). The
PROTECT Act criminalizes virtually any sex act that a U.S. citizen (or permanent
resident) engages in, in a foreign country, with a person under age eighteen. Id.
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2) (2006) (providing explicitly for jurisdiction over
"foreign persons" in enumerated situations); id. § 1956(f) (providing explicitly for
extraterritorial jurisdiction when the relevant conduct "is by a United States citizen or,
in the case of a non-United States citizen, the conduct occurs in part in the United
States; and (2) the transaction or series of related transactions involves funds or
monetary instruments of a value exceeding $10,000").
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rule. Some statutes contain explicit statements of
nonextraterritoriality. Examples include certain provisions relating
to banking regulation, 64 performance by military musicians in
competition with civilian musicians, 65 depletion of geothermal
deposits, 66 use of Department of Defense appropriations for golf
courses, 67 reporting requirements for cash transactions 68 and
monetary-instrument transactions, 69 and use of funds for rural
electrification projects.70
Other statutes qualify as territorially limited because they
explicitly relate to physical space within the United States. A small
selection of examples includes statutes relating to grazing on U.S.
public lands,7 1 removal of fossils from public lands,7 2 and drain covers
on public pools and spas in the United States.7 3 Others contain less
explicit statements (patent law) 74 or no explicit statement (copyright
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1828()(3) (2006). This subsection provides: (A) that certain
statutory provisions relating to "[t]ransactions with affiliates ... shall not apply with
respect to a foreign bank solely because the foreign bank has an insured branch"; and
(B) that certain provisions relating to "[elxtensions of credit to officers, directors, and
principal shareholders . . . shall not apply with respect to a foreign bank solely because
the foreign bank has an insured branch, but shall apply with respect to the insured
branch." Id. § 1828()(3)(A)-(B).
65. 10 U.S.C. § 974 (2006).
66. 26 U.S.C. § 613 (2006).
67. 10 U.S.C. § 2491a (2006).
68. 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (2006).
69. 31 U.S.C. § 5331 (2006).
70. 7 U.S.C. § 906a (2006).
71. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2006) (relating to the establishment and use of
grazing districts on public lands).
72. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 470aaa to 470aaa-11 (2006) (regulating removal of
"paleontological resources" from federal lands).
73. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 8003(c) (2006) (requiring pool and spa drain covers to
be in compliance with American National Standards Institute standards).
74. Federal patent law has existed in the United States since 1790. Curtis A.
Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L
L. 505, 520 (1997) (citing Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793)). In 1857
and again in 1913, the Supreme Court interpreted the then-existing patent laws as
confined to the physical territory of the United States. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183,
195 (1857); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915).
When Congress revised the U.S. patent laws in 1952, it provided a patentee with a
temporary right "to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention
throughout the United States." Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 154, 66 Stat.
792 (emphasis added); see also Bradley, supra, at 520 (emphasizing same text). Similar
language is retained in the current version of the statute, which also prohibits "offering
for sale" or "importing" a patented product or process into the-United States. 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(1) (2006). Section 154(a)(1) of Title 35 of the U.S. Code indicates:
Contents.-Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant
to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a
process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling
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law),75 but cover fields where statutes have existed-and have been
treated by courts as territorially limited-since the late eighteenth or
early nineteenth centuries.7 6 Like extraterritorial rules, territorially
limited rules require little judicial involvement in questions of
territorial scope.
C. Potentially Extraterritorial Standards
Unlike the first two categories, the third category of statutes
requires extensive judicial involvement in questions of territorial
scope. Potentially extraterritorial standards do not contain an explicit
indication of territorial scope and may contain general language that
could be read to apply worldwide.
Examples include § 1 of the Sherman Act, prohibiting "[e]very
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade"; n
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, prohibiting "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security," the use of "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance";7 8 and § 33 of the
Jones Act, permitting "[a] seaman injured in the course of
employment" to "elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of
trial by jury, against the employer."79
These statutes contain no explicit statement as to either
extraterritoriality or nonextraterritoriality, and their subject matters
neither require nor exclude the possibility of extraterritorial
throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products
made by that process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.
Id. As suggested by a combination of statutory text and preenactment case law, the
Supreme Court has treated U.S. patent law as setting out a territorially limited rule.
75. Copyright law, like patent law, has been governed by federal statute since
1790. See Bradley, supra note 74, at 523 (citing Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat.
124). The basic structure of current U.S. copyright law dates to the Copyright Act of
1976. See Maria A. Pallante, Preface to CIRCULAR 92: COPYRIGHT LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES AND RELATED LAws CONTAINED IN TITLE 17 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE, at V
(2011). Unlike the patent statute, the copyright statute does not contain text
suggesting it is limited to U.S. territory. See Bradley, supra note 74, at 523; see also 17
U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (setting out general subject matter eligible for copyright). Were it a
new statute today, it could have been treated by courts as a potentially extraterritorial
standard. However, it was interpreted in 1908 as a strictly territorial statute, United
Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260, 266 (1908), and this appears to
have been its consistent treatment in lower courts, see, e.g., Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-
Pathe Commc'ns Co., 23 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), up to and following
the United States' accession to the Universal Copyright Convention in 1955, the Berne
Convention on Literary and Artistic Works in 1989, and the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in 1994.
76. See supra notes 74-75.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
79. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006).
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application.8 0 Because of this ambiguity, the territorial scope of a
statute structured as a potentially extraterritorial standard is a
subject that permits courts to exercise substantial discretion.8 1
Broad language paired with an omission of any statement with
respect to territorial scope is most likely to result in a potentially
extraterritorial standard. During periods when antiextraterritoriality
interpretive methods dominate the federal courts, potentially
extraterritorial standards are likely to be supplemented with
territorially limited rules that remove some conduct from the initial
standard's scope. Conversely, during periods when
proextraterritoriality interpretive methods dominate, potentially
extraterritorial standards are likely to be supplemented with
extraterritorial rules that encompass situations previously governed
by the standard.
Of course, drafters and lobbyists confident in their ability to
predict their future preferences will prefer either extraterritorial
rules or territorially limited rules for particular categories of conduct.
However, interest-group theory and prior legislative outcomes both
suggest that it is difficult to secure agreement on precise statements
as to geographic scope. One can expect that Congress will continue to
pass laws structured as potentially extraterritorial standards. And,
similarly, we can expect that courts will continue to reach fact-
centered, case-by-case decisions on the territorial scope of statutes.
Figure 2, below, sets out examples of statutes falling into the
three categories discussed above. References to Supreme Court cases
dealing with the territorial scope of the relevant statutes are included
on the line below each statute. Note that the canonical cases cluster
exclusively in the right-hand column. The next Part will focus on the
methods courts use to resolve cases involving potentially
extraterritorial standards.
80. Cf. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-77 (1953) (commenting on the
broad language of the Jones Act).
81. Courts recognize that Congress often fails to specify territorial scope, and
many modern statutory-interpretation theories hold that statutes must be read on the
assumption that Congress is effectively delegating issues on which it cannot reach a
consensus to court and agency interpretation. Assuming that issues of territorial scope
arise relatively infrequently and are of less concern to domestic constituents than
many other issues, it is not unreasonable to assume that reaching consensus on
territorial scope is likely to be excessively costly for many statutes.
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Figure 2-Territorial Scope of U.S. Statutes
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IV. THREE TYPES OF INTERPRETIVE METHODS
This Part analyzes the interpretive methods that courts use to
determine whether a potentially extraterritorial standard applies in a
specific fact situation. Most extraterritoriality decisions involve both
detailed discussion of the case's facts and reference to one or more
canons of interpretation. From the rules and standards perspective,
82. These miscellaneous statutes deal with topics such as where military
musicians can compete with civilian musicians and where the Department of Defense
can use appropriate funds to build a golf course. See supra notes 71-73 and
accompanying text.
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the specific interpretive method applied by a court is less relevant
than the result it encourages.
Part IV.A discusses proextraterritoriality interpretive methods,
which push the court toward finding that a statute applies
extraterritorially. Part IV.B discusses antiextraterritoriality
interpretive methods, which push in the opposite direction, toward
finding that a statute does not apply extraterritorially. Part IV.C
discusses territorially neutral interpretive methods, which do not
push the court in either direction. This set of territorially neutral
interpretive methods is the largest group and contains most of the
broad theories of statutory interpretation.
Before developing these methods in more detail, it is useful to
begin with a more general observation: extraterritorial statutes have
two basic preconditions. First, prevailing doctrine must accept the
idea that state power can extend beyond the regulating state's
territory. Second, prevailing doctrine must accept that there is no
bar-in either positive or natural law-to more than one state
purporting to apply its statutory law to a particular fact situation.
In the United States, traditional approaches to choice of law
were hostile to extraterritorial regulation. This began to change in
the 1930s, as the Supreme Court began to accept the idea that states
could apply positive law to events in other states.83 A term introduced
by the Court in Alaska. Packers Association v. Industrial Accident
Commission of California, "governmental interest," 84 became
important in Currie's proposed choice-of-law methodology,
governmental-interest analysis.8 5 Academics and courts developed
numerous, modified versions of Currie's ideas, each of which tended
to be more proextraterritorial (in state law, rather than federal law)
than traditional choice-of-law methods.86
83. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 547
(1935) (upholding California's application of the California worker's compensation
statute to injury of Mexican citizen in Alaska). Eight years earlier, the Permanent
Court of International Justice had rendered a decision that two or more countries could
have concurrent criminal jurisdiction as a matter of public international law. S.S.
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, T 307 (Sept. 7).
84. Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547.
85. Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without
Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 466 (noting use of the term "interest" in Alaska
Packers and Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of
California, 306 U.S. 493 (1939)).
86. On academic alternatives to Currie's theory, see supra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text. The Restatement (First) was based on a territorial theory of law,
seeking to apply the law of the territory where the right "vested." Each the other
theories was more proextraterritorial than the traditional method is; each of these
other theories accepted the idea of applying the law someplace other than the territory
where some "last act" took place.
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A. Proextraterritoriality
Proextraterritoriality interpretive methods place a thumb on the
scale in favor of extraterritorial application. Part IV.A.1 discusses
analysis of state interests, both in its purer Curriean form and in the
more relaxed versions common in extraterritoriality cases today. Part
IV.A.2 discusses the last-in-time rule-the doctrine that, as a matter
of U.S. domestic law, Congress is not constrained by international
law. Part IV.A.3 discusses the traditional bases for jurisdiction in
international law, which are sometimes examined by U.S. courts
deciding extraterritoriality cases.
1. Analysis of Interests
Pure interest analysis, of the type advocated by Currie, focuses
the extraterritoriality inquiry on a specific conception of objectively
legitimate state action. In particular situations, states have sufficient
interests to apply their law extraterritorially; in others, they do not.8 7
Under the pure version of Currie's theory, states have interests only
in providing recovery to in-state plaintiffs and protecting in-state
defendants.88
In that pure form, interest analysis could perhaps be seen as
territorially neutral. At times, it permits states to apply their law; at
other times, it does not allow them to do so-even if the legislature
explicitly expresses a will to, say, protect an out-of-state defendant
and harm an in-state plaintiff.
In its less pure form, however, the idea of a state interest
interacts with the effects doctrine to act as a one-way ratchet in favor
of extraterritorial application. The basic change is this: in its pure
Curriean form, an interest exists only when a statute is meant to
favor a domiciliary. Outside of its pure Curriean form, however, a
state can be deemed to have an interest in regulating almost
anything that has an effect within its territory.89 In this latter form,
the only limit on a state's interest is the degree of effect necessary to
87. See generally CURRIE, Notes, supra note 43, at 177-87 (1963) (explaining
circumstances in which states have an interest in the extraterritorial application of
their laws).
88. See id.
89. In other words, the idea of a state interest is not sufficiently precise to
impose meaningful limits on the scope of a state's extraterritorial authority. See
Brilmayer, supra note 85, at 460 (noting, with respect to domestic choice of law, that
the term interest-as used in governmental-interest analysis-"ha[s] no clear
meaning[] any more"); c.f. Aleinikoff, supra note 37, at 1002 (criticizing the use of
undefined "interest[s]" as a basis for deciding First Amendment cases, and suggesting
that this concept can permit courts to rely on policy considerations more appropriate to
legislative than judicial decision making).
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justify that interest.9 0 A butterfly flapping its wings in China may not
be enough, but many basic regulatory interests will be-at least to
the extent they find the ear of a sympathetic court.
2. Last-in-Time Rule
While not strictly a statutory construction doctrine, the last-in-
time rule-the doctrine that Congress has the power to act contrary
to international law 9 1-plays a proextraterritoriality role. Frequently,
there is some question (often of a standard-like character) as to
whether extending a particular law extraterritorially is permitted by
public international law. 92 Congress's power to act contrary to
international law relegates the issue to a matter of congressional
intent.9 3 As developed below, there is a presumption that Congress
does not intend to act contrary to international law, but this can be
overridden by a clear statement of intent.9 4 With a clear statement,
there is no longer any question of international law for a U.S. court to
address.
3. Traditional Categories of International Jurisdiction
The third set of proextraterritoriality doctrines is the traditional
set of "categories" or "principles" thought to justify state jurisdiction
90. See supra note 89.
91. Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam); Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S.
580, 597 (1884). While these cases dealt explicitly with international treaties, it is
widely accepted that Congress has the constitutional power to take actions that violate
customary international law. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542
U.S. 155, 164 (2004) ("This rule of construction [the presumption that Congress does
not intend to violate international law] reflects principles of customary international
law-law that (we must assume) Congress ordinarily seeks to follow." (emphasis
added)).
Indeed, the existence of a presumption that Congress does not intend to act
contrary to international law, see infra Part IV.B.2, assumes that Congress can-and
sometimes does-take actions contrary to international law. This power does not mean
that the United States will not suffer consequences (such as being on the receiving end
of retaliatory actions by other countries, or being ordered to pay reparations by an
international tribunal) when Congress acts contrary to international law; it simply
means that there is no domestic law bar to Congress choosing to do so.
For a general overview of the last-in-time rule, focusing on the relationship
between treaties and statutes, see CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 461-67 (3d ed. 2008).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006)
(analyzing whether the child-sex-tourism provision of the PROTECT act was consistent
with international law).
93. See sources cited supra note 91 (discussing Congress's intent when it
enacted the applicable statutes).
94. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the presumption that Congress does not
intend to violate international law).
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under public international law.95 These tend to include some or all of
the following: nationality (when the subjects of regulation are the
state's nationals), effects (physical or economic) within a state's
territory, protective jurisdiction (based on harm to a state's security
interests), passive personality (based on harm to a state's nationals),
objective jurisdiction (based on a sufficient nexus of events to the
state), and universal jurisdiction (applying to a very limited set of
offenses, of which piracy is the paradigmatic example).96
This is not the place to discuss these categories in detail. For this
Article's purposes, what is interesting is that a large portion of the
situations in which states might choose to exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction fall into at least one of these categories. Moreover, courts
that undertake an analysis of these jurisdictional categories tend to
conclude that either a strong showing in one category or a weaker
showing in multiple categories is sufficient to satisfy any
international law requirements.9 7
The large number of fact situations encompassed by these
jurisdictional categories means they tend to encourage, rather than
discourage, a court from concluding that a statute applies
extraterritorially.
B. Aatiextraterritoriality
Antiextraterritoriality interpretive methods place a thumb on
the scale against extraterritorial application. Part IV.B.1 discusses
territorial theories of state power. Part IV.B.2 discusses the
presumption against extraterritoriality, the doctrine at the center of
most academic discussions of the territorial scope of U.S. federal law.
Part IV.B.3 discusses the presumption that Congress does not intend
to violate international law. This doctrine is often discussed together
with the presumption against extraterritoriality. Part IV.B.4
discusses international comity, a doctrine based on the idea that
states should at times refrain from doing things within their power in
deference to the rights, interests, or sovereignty of other states.
95. A recent summary is set out in CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN LAW 12-14 (2007). For the classic
statement of these jurisdictional categories, see Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime, in 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 445 ( Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Draft
Convention].
96. See, e.g., Draft Convention, supra note 95, at 445; DOYLE, supra note 95,. at
12. Territory (based on events within the state's territory) is typically included at the
front of this list as the strongest basis for jurisdiction. It has been omitted from the list
above because-unlike the other bases-it cannot logically serve a
proextraterritoriality function.
97. In the United States, this analysis is usually undertaken as a subpart of a
court's analysis of the presumption that Congress intends to comply with international
law. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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1. Territorial Theories of State Power
The most antiextraterritoriality interpretive method is the
position that a state's power to apply its law is coextensive with-and
limited by-its physical territory.98 In its strongest form, this would
include the position that a state's law cannot extend beyond its land
or territorial waters. However, the United States has never applied
the strongest form of such a territorial theory. Congress has long
asserted some degree of legal authority over actions on the high
seas99 and over U.S. citizens abroad. 00
2. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The second antiextraterritoriality interpretive method is the
presumption against extraterritoriality. The presumption has been
applied frequently but inconsistently. While often phrased in the form
of a rule, it has in practice operated as a standard: it does not appear
to dictate in advance the outcome of the analysis for many disputes.
The Supreme Court has at times applied the presumption strictly,101
and at times ignored it entirely. 102
3. Presumption that Congress Does Not Intend to Violate
International Law
The third antiextraterritoriality interpretive method is the
presumption that Congress does not intend to violate international
98. The classic statement of this is presented in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
722-24 (1878). However, even in the Pennoyer era Congress exercised some
extraterritorial authority. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
99. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 8-13, 1 Stat. 112, 113-15 (1790)
(criminalizing murder, robbery, and other certain acts committed on the high seas); see
also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (permitting Congress "[tjo define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas").
100. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437-38 (1932); United States
v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922). On the United States' extensive exercise of
extraterritorial rights in China, see EILEEN P. ScULLY, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE
FROM AFAR: AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP IN TREATY PORT CHINA, 1844-1942 (2001).
101. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010)
(securities fraud); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
(antidiscrimination); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909)
(antitrust).
102. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S 764 (1993) (failing to
mention the presumption against extraterritoriality in the majority opinion). The
majority's failure to mention the presumption against extraterritoriality is made more
striking by the dissent's explicit discussion of this same presumption. See id. at 814
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing both the presumption against extraterritoriality and
the presumption that Congress does not intend to violate international law). Of course,
from the perspective of social-choice theory, this inconsistency is not surprising. See
Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 830-31.
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law. This requires either a determination or an assumption about
what the international law of jurisdiction is. In the Supreme Court,
this frequently takes the form of reliance on the Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations of the United States as either a statement
of,10 3 or a proxy for, the relevant international law.104 The inquiry
typically centers on the Restatement's "reasonableness" provision-a
paradigmatic example of a standard.10 5
4. Comity
The term comity has been used to describe a broad set of
circumstances under which a state refrains from applying its law to a
situation involving foreign elements. 10 6 Within an individual state,
the fact of exercising comity may be less important than the question
of what substate actor makes the comity decision. Comity can be
exercised by any of the main branches of government. This Article
uses the term legislative comity to describe a decision by Congress not
to extend a particular law to a fact situation (or type of fact situation)
with foreign elements; executive comity to refer to a decision by the
executive branch not to take an enforcement action in a fact situation
with foreign elements; and judicial comity to refer to a decision by a
court to decline to apply a law to a fact situation with foreign
elements. 0 7
As a general matter, legislative comity tends to be the most rule-
like of the three. Congress can, of course, pass a private bill relating
103. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004)
(appearing to treat the Restatement as reflecting the relevant international law);
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813 (same).
104. Justice Scalia expressly relied on the Restatement in Hartford Fire:
I shall rely on the Restatement (Third) for the relevant principles of
international law . . . . Whether the Restatement precisely reflects
international law in every detail matters little here, as I believe this litigation
would be resolved the same way under virtually any conceivable test that takes
account of foreign regulatory interests."
509 U.S. at 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987). The text of the "reasonableness" provision is set out supra note 20. On some of
the problems created by § 403's interest-balancing approach, see generally Philip J.
McConnaughay, Reviving the "Public Law Taboo" in International Conflict of Laws, 35
STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 288-89 (1999).
106. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign
Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1179-81 (2007) (grouping the presumption that
Congress intends to comply with international law, the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the act-of-state doctrine, the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine,
and more general application of the idea of comity together as the "Comity Doctrines").
107. Cf. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 817-18 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
for a distinction between the abstention-like "comity of courts" and an idea of
"prescriptive comity," which is "exercised by legislatures when they enact laws").
2013/ 199
VANDERBIL T/OURNL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
to a specific fact situation. More frequently, however, Congress passes
laws that explicitly limit the application of a statute in situations
with certain foreign elements.
Executive comity can be rule-like or standard-like. When an
executive agency acts through delegated rule-making authority, it is
likely to act in a rule-like manner. When an executive agency makes
a decision not to act in an individual enforcement situation, this ;s
likely to be a standard-like exercise of comity. 0 8
Judicial comity can also be rule-like or standard-like, depending
on the manner in which the court makes its comity decisions. To the
extent a court announces general, forward-looking rules divorced
from particular facts, judicial comity can operate in a rule-like
manner-clarifying how a statute should be read in the future.
However, to the extent a court reaches fact-centered decisions-and
especially to the extent those fact-centered decisions rest on weak or
nonexistent distinctions from prior, similar cases with opposite
results-the court acts in a standard-like manner. The more a court
rests its comity decision on the factual details of particular cases, the
more judicial comity begins to resemble an abstention doctrine rather
than a method of statutory interpretation. 09
C. Territorially Neutral
Territorially neutral interpretive methods neither favor nor
disfavor extraterritorial application. Unlike the specialized doctrines
discussed in the last two sections, many of these territorially neutral
interpretive methods are broad theories of statutory interpretation.
Part IV.C.1 discusses archaeological theories, which seek to
determine the content of a statute by reference to the intent of the
enacting legislature. 110 Part IV.C.2 discusses dynamic theories, which
108. An exercise of comity is rule-like when it is structured to make outcomes
possible to predict in advance. An exercise of comity is standard-like when the comity
decision turns on the facts of particular situation. Legislative comity will typically be
rule-like because it is exercised when a law is structured. Judicial comity will typically
be standard-like because it involves a decision to abstain from applying the law in a
particular fact situation. Executive comity can be rule-like or standard-like, because-
in the modern administrative state-the executive has the opportunity to both issue
regulations and exercise enforcement discretion.
109. Cf. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
lower courts for exercising a type of judicial comity that functioned in effect as an
abstention doctrine).
110. I borrow from William Eskridge the idea of dividing the leading statutory
interpretation theories into "archaeological" and "dynamic" varieties. See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9, 13 (1994). Eskridge credits
Charles Curtis for the "archaeological" term. Id. I separately discuss Einer Elhauge's
proposal for preference-eliciting default rules. These differ fundamentally from
archaeological and dynamic theories because preference-eliciting default rules
deliberately choose interpretations of statutes because they are the opposite of what
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seek to determine the content of a statute by reference either to
present-day conceptions of good policy or to present-day preferences
of various institutional actors in the lawmaking and statutory
interpretation process. Part IV.C.3 discusses preference-eliciting
default rules, an aggressive statutory interpretation theory with a
very different goal from most other methods. Part IV.C.4 discusses
other, more general, common-law canons of construction.
1. Archaeological Theories
Searches for specific legislative intent or broad legislative
purpose should not systematically favor or disfavor extraterritorial
application. To the extent one accepts the idea of legislative intent, it
requires a context-dependent evaluation of what some legislature
(either current or past) collectively intended. Sometimes this will
suggest extraterritorial application; other times it will not. In either
situation, ample room remains for the interpreter to allow his or her
own substantive views to color the search for legislative intent.
Similarly, a search for broad legislative purpose of the type
envisioned by the legal process school should not cut for or against
extraterritoriality.
Textual analysis proves more difficult. This theory purports to be
less context dependent, looking instead for general rules that can be
applied mechanically to diverse fact situations. Whether textual
analysis is proextraterritorial or antiextraterritorial depends
primarily on the relevant baseline. As an empirical matter, most
statutes do not address territorial scope. If the default rule is that
statutes apply everywhere, textual analysis should be
proextraterritorial. If the default rule is that statutes are territorially
limited (as implied by the presumption against extraterritoriality),
then textual analysis becomes an antiextraterritoriality interpretive
method.
2. Dynamic Theories
Dynamic theories of statutory interpretation differ from
archaeological theories in that they do not confine themselves to
searching for the narrow (intentionalist), broad (purposive), or
explicitly expressed (textualist) intent of prior legislatures. I"
the current legislature (or powerful groups in the electorate) would want. See EINER
ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: How To INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 9-
12 (2008).
111. On dynamic theories of statutory interpretation, see ESKRIDGE, supra note
110, at 9, and Stephen F. Ross, The Location and Limits of Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation in Modern Judicial Reasoning, ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2002),
available at http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ils.
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Instead, dynamic theories focus on the application of statutes to two
types of fact situations: those not envisioned at the time of the
statute's promulgation" 2 and those with a fundamentally different
social or political meaning from that which existed at the time of
statute's promulgation.11 3
In dealing with fact situations not envisioned by the enacting
legislature, dynamic theories may focus on pragmatic reasoning. This
could lead the interpreter to try to determine the best current
policy." 4 Alternatively, it might lead the interpreter to imagine what
the enacting legislature would have wanted, if it had-using current
values-envisioned the relevant factual circumstances. 115 This
inquiry differs from that imagined by purposive archaeological
theories in that it imports current social and political values in
understanding the purposes of the enacting legislature." 6
An alternative method of dynamic statutory interpretation
involves a more formalized game incorporating the "anticipated
response" of various institutional actors. 117 Under this variety of
dynamic theory, the various players in the interpretive process seek
to satisfy their own policy preferences." 8 However, in choosing how
far to go in seeking to satisfy their preferences, they incorporate the
anticipated response of other institutional power centers." 9 In other
words, an agency or court charged with interpreting a statute will go
as far as it can go without provoking another institutional actor into
blocking or overruling it. All else being equal, agencies will interpret
statutes more aggressively when the legislature is controlled by the
same political party as the executive. 120 Similarly, courts will
interpret statutes more aggressively (in accord with their own policy
preferences) when the composition of the legislature or the executive
branch suggests it is unlikely that those aggressive interpretations
will be overruled.' 2 '
112. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 110, at 52.
113. See id. at 53.
114. See id. at 57.
115. See id.
116. The interpreter does not view the statutory text in isolation, but reads
it in connection with the legislative history, statutory practicing
precedents, and current norms and values. Thus, a clear text whose
plain meaning is unreasonable and apparently unanticipated by the
legislature may be interpreted to be consistent with that legislative
history .. . or that purpose and current values ....
Id. at 56.
117. See id. at 74.
118. See id. at 74-80.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 74-80.
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For purposes of this Article, the primary relevance of dynamic
theories is that, like archaeological theories, they should not work
systematically either for or against extraterritorial application. The
first type of dynamic theory, concerned with changed factual
circumstances, will in some instances work for and in some instances
work against extraterritorial application. It is likely to work for
extraterritorial application in situations where the regulatory
problem that appears to be the focus of the statute has developed in
such a way that is difficult to regulate through purely territorial
authority.12 2 It is likely to work against extraterritorial application in
those situations where changes in state political and economic power
suggest that the cost of extraterritorial application (either to the
United States as a whole or to particular, politically influential
groups) exceeds the likely benefits.
This second type of dynamic theory can also work for or against
extraterritorial application. If other institutional actors are perceived
to have a preference for extraterritorial application of the relevant
statute, it will work in a proextraterritoriality manner. If other
institutional actors are perceived to have a preference against
extraterritorial application of the relevant statute, it will work in an
antiextraterritoriality manner.
In understanding the anticipated-response variety of dynamic
theory, it is most straightforward to focus on domestic institutional
actors. To the extent foreign actors are considered, it is possible that
an anticipated-response theory would function in a generally
antiextraterritoriality manner. Experience within the realm of
statutes classified as potentially extraterritorial standards suggests
that foreign countries generally oppose the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law. However, it is possible to anticipate situations
where some institutional actors in foreign governments would
appreciate extraterritorial application of specific U.S. statutes. For
example, in countries with high levels of internal corruption, those
actors in government opposed to corruption might favor aggressive
enforcement of the FCPA. By reducing the supply of bribes available,
the FCPA could help foreign government actors opposed to corruption
mitigate their own principal-agent problems. 2 3
122. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu: WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?:
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006) (examining territorial authority in the
context of the internet).
123. On bribery regulation as a principal-agent problem, see Adam I.
Muchmore, Private Regulation and Foreign Conduct, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 371, 402-
03 (2010).
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3. Preference-Eliciting Default Rules
Einer Elhauge has proposed that in certain cases, courts rely on
preference-eliciting default rules.124 These preference-eliciting default
rules function in a manner opposite to that of most statutory
interpretation theories. While most statutory interpretation theories
seek to determine the intent of some past or present legislature,
preference-eliciting default rules seek to choose an interpretation
diametrically opposed to what the current legislature is likely to
want.125 The idea is to provoke the current legislature into acting to
clarify its preferences in situations where the court is unable to
determine those preferences through other means.
Preference-eliciting default rules should not work systematically
either for or against extraterritorial application. To the extent that
powerful groups with access to the legislative process are expected to
prefer extraterritorial application, preference-eliciting default rules
will work as an antiextraterritoriality interpretive method. To the
extent that powerful groups with access to the legislative process are
expected to oppose extraterritorial application, preference-eliciting
default rules will work as a proextraterritoriality interpretive
method. On balance, this approach to statutory interpretation should
be territorially neutral, as different groups will favor or oppose
extraterritorial application in different situations.
4. Other Canons of Construction
One final variety of territorially neutral interpretation methods
is the use of common-law canons of construction (other than the two
antiextraterritoriality canons discussed in Parts IV.B.2 and
IV.B.3).126 Karl Llewellyn famously observed that "there are two
opposing canons on almost every point"-and that case outcomes
were determined less by the canons themselves than by which canon
the interpreting court chose to apply. 127 William Eskridge has
124. Elhauge proposes that these preference-eliciting default rules be used when
courts can determine neither the preferences of the current legislature nor the
preferences of the enacting legislature. See ELHAUGE, supra note 110, at 9-12.
125. Id. at 12.
126. See supra Part IV.A-B.
127. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of the Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401
(1950); see also Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC
(Aug. 24, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.tnr.comlarticle/magazinelbooks-and-
arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism# (reviewing ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
(2012)) (making a similar criticism of the book's endorsement of "fifty-seven 'canons of
construction,"' which Posner suggests are far more indeterminate than Scalia and
Garner describe them to be).
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supplemented Llewellyn's analysis with two important observations.
First, courts often have many potentially applicable canons from
which to choose.1 28 Second, courts--especially the Supreme Court-
can choose the "relative weight" of each canon and how it will interact
with other potentially applicable canons.129
Eskridge divides the various common-law canons into three
types: (1) "substantive canons" that set out "policy rules and
presumptions"; 130 (2) "textual canons" that set out "precepts of
grammar, syntax, and logical inference";13 ' and (3) "extrinsic source
canons" that set out "rules of deference to the interpretations others
have placed the statutory language."132
Two of the substantive canons discussed above were
antiextraterritoriality interpretive methods: the presumption against
extraterritoriality and the presumption that Congress intends to comply
with international law. In addition to these, the canon of avoiding
"interpretations that would render a statute unconstitutional" 3 3 could
work in a systematically antiextraterritoriality manner if other
constitutional provisions are interpreted to place constitutional limits on
Congress's extraterritorial authority.134
The extrinsic-source canons are more straightforward. These
canons, which consist primarily of requirements for deference to
congressional, agency, or prior court interpretations of a statute,
should not operate in either a proextraterritoriality or
antiextraterritoriality manner. When prior interpretations have been
proextraterritorial, these canons will favor the same. When prior
interpretations have been antiextraterritorial, these canons will also
do the same.
The textual canons should also be territorially neutral, but with
the same baseline exception that applies to textualist archaeological
128. EsKRIDGE, supra note 110, at 280-81.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 276; see also id. at 325-28 (listing substantive canons).
131. Id. at 276; see also id. at 323-24 (listing textual canons).
132. Id. at 276; see also id. at 324-25 (listing extrinsic-source canons). Eskridge
lists extrinsic-source canons first, textual canons second, and substantive canons
third-the order is altered here to make sense with the textual discussion that follows.
133. Id. at 325.
134. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause appears to be the constitutional
provision most likely to be interpreted to impose such limits. However, the Fifth
Amendment's role as a limit on extraterritoriality has been limited. See Lea Brilmayer
& Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105
HARv. L. REv. 1217, 1223 (1992) (observing that the Supreme Court had neither
adopted nor rejected the proposition that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
limits the extraterritorial reach of substantive federal law); cf. Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) ("Because the Constitution's separation-of-powers structure,
like the substantive guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, protects
persons as well as citizens, foreign nationals who have the privilege of litigating in our
courts can seek to enforce separation-of-powers principles." (citations omitted)).
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theories. 3 5 The textual canons tend to require courts to follow the
plain meaning of the statutory text, to assume that including one
thing means excluding other things, and similar interpretive
assumptions. If the baseline is that statutes only apply within the
United States (as suggested by the presumption against
extraterritoriality), the textual canons will work in an
antiextraterritoriality manner. However, if the substantive content of
the relevant statute makes it seems necessarily extraterritorial to the
court, the corollary to the plain meaning rule-that the plain
meaning should not be applied when the text suggests an absurd
result-makes textual canons function in a proextraterritoriality
manner.
Figure 3, below, sets out examples of statutory interpretation
methods falling into the three categories discussed in this Part
(proextraterritoriality, antiextraterritoriality, and territorially
neutral). The chart suggests that disagreement about the
extraterritorial scope of statutes may be largely unrelated to the most
politically charged disputes about statutory interpretation. In
particular, the disagreement between those who advocate
archaeological theories of statutory interpretation (generally
associated with the political right) and those who advocate dynamic
theories of statutory interpretation (generally associated with the
political left) does not appear to dictate the choice between
proextraterritoriality and antiextraterritoriality interpretive
methods. While the presumption against extraterritoriality may, to a
limited extent, be currently associated with Justices who advocate the
textual version of the archaeological approach, it is possible to
imagine the same presumption with very different political
valence.136
135. See supra Part IV.C.1.
136. Cf. J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN.
L. REV. 869, 870-71 (1993) (describing the changing political valence of ideas over
time).
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Figure 3-Three Types of Interpretive Methods
Proextraterritoriality Antiextraterritoriality Territorially Neutral
* Analysis of state Territorial theories of Most traditional
"interests" (relaxed, state power (Pennoyer methodologies of
impure derivative of era) statutory interpretation
Currie's "governmental Presumption against Archaeological
interest analysis") extraterritoriality Legislative
* Last-in-Time Rule (rule Presumption that intent
that Congress is not Congress does not intend Purposivism
constrained by to violate international Textualism
international law) law Dynamic/normative
* Traditional "categories" Concept/doctrine of theories
of international international comity * Pragmatism
jurisdiction (territory, Law and economics
nationality, effects, (rationallbehavioral/
passive personality, public choice)




Most other canons of
construction
V. PRECEDENT, THROUGH RULES AND STANDARDS
As a matter of legal doctrine, leading extraterritoriality
precedents are difficult, and perhaps impossible, to reconcile.
However, as a matter of practice, it does not appear that there is
substantial uncertainty, except at the margins, about the territorial
scope of U.S. federal law. This presents a puzzle-how does doctrinal
conflict lead to relatively settled law in practice?
One obvious response is that this could happen if legal doctrine
was not driving outcomes, either at the Supreme Court level or in the
lower courts. The extreme realist version of this position-today
associated with the attitudinal model of judging' 3 7-is that outcomes
137. On legal realism, see generally KALMAN, supra note 26. On the attitudinal
model of judging, see generally Howard Gillman, What's Law Got To Do with It?
Judicial Behavioralists Test the "Legal Model" of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 465, 467, 486-87 (2001) (reviewing HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A.
SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT (1999)).
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are instead driven by the political preferences of judges. 3 8 Yet this
response does not seem to fully explain extraterritoriality decisions,
which sometimes generate substantial consensus-at least for the
ultimate result.'3 9 One possibility is that outcomes are being driven
not by a political view, but by a jurisprudential one-by a preference
for either rules or standards. This preference could be operating as a
general matter 140 or in the specific context of extraterritoriality
cases,14 1 and could vary based on interaction with other institutional
actors' preferences for rules or standards.
This suggestion may seem straightforward. However, existing
literature does not seem to treat territorial scope in this direct
manner.14 2 Courts and academics tend to treat extraterritoriality as a
jumbled area of law in need of rationalization and consistency.1 43
This Article contends that existing decisions are better explained by
using the rule/standard spectrum than by other, more complicated
attempts at rationalization. Of course, this approach does not allow
one to foresee with precision how any individual court will approach
an extraterritoriality question.
The Supreme Court's decisions in extraterritorial antitrust cases
provide a useful illustration of the role of rules and standards in
extraterritoriality decision making. In American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 144 the Supreme Court refused-in a rule-like
manner-to apply U.S. antitrust laws in private civil litigation
between two U.S. banana companies operating in Latin America.
During the decades following the 1909 American Banana
decision, the Supreme Court gradually retreated from the position
that U.S. antitrust laws did not apply outside of U.S. territory. 14 5 It
138. A version of this argument is frequently made with respect to the Supreme
Court's Aramco decision. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 110, at 283; Larry Kramer, Vestiges
of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 180-84
(1992).
139. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (5 in
majority, 3 concurring, 1 not participating, 0 dissenting); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (6 in majority; 1 concurring; 1 not participating, 0
dissenting). But see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (5-4
decision split on fairly typical lines); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil. Co., 499 U.S. 244
(1991) (5 majority; 1 concurring; 3 dissenting; split along fairly typical lines).
140. See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 112-21 (analyzing the degree to which
individual Justices' general preferences for rules or for standards influenced the 1991
Supreme Court term).
141. See infra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
142. The closest I have found is a recent article by Paul Stephan. See Stephan,
Extraterritoriality, supra note 53, at 10, 15 (discussing the role of standards in a
political-economy analysis of extraterritoriality).
143. See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality,
97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2011) (noting this phenomenon and citing relevant sources).
144. 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
145. The Court did this not by overruling American Banana, but by
distinguishing and narrowing it. First, the Court concluded in United States v. Pacific
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was probably necessary for the Court to back away from American
Banana, because many aspects of that case's reasoning are not easily
compatible with domestic regulation of international business. 146
What is interesting, however, is that the Court conducted this
backing away not by overruling American Banana, but by treating
the territorial scope of the Sherman Act as a standard rather than a
rule. In each of the relevant cases, the Court's conclusion that the
Sherman Act applied rested in significant part on a determination
that the relevant events had a sufficient connection to U.S. territory.
The modern era of international antitrust regulation began with
the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Aluminum Company
of America (Alcoa) decision. 147 Alcoa was an antitrust case of
& Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co. that rates charged on a rail and steamship route
between Alaska and the mainland United States were subject to U.S. antitrust law
because portions of the route were within U.S. territory. See 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913)
(concluding that U.S. antitrust law could be applied to portions of steam and rail
transportation route that were in the United States). Second, the Court concluded in
Thomsen v. Cayser that rates charged on a steamship route between New York and
South Africa were subject to antitrust law because the alleged cartel "affected the
foreign commerce of this country and was put into operation here." 243 U.S. 66, 88
(1917) (citing Pacific & Arctic, 228 U.S. 87) (concluding that U.S. antitrust law could be
applied to a steamship transportation route between the United States and South
Africa). Neither Pacific & Arctic nor Thomsen made any reference to the American
Banana decision, though both cases directly addressed the territorial scope of U.S.
antitrust law. Thomsen, 243 U.S. at 88; Pacific & Arctic, 228 U.S. at 106. Third, the
Court explicitly distinguished American Banana in United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.
274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927). In Sisal, the Court faced a situation not unlike American
Banana in that it involved U.S. companies monopolizing trade in a product produced in
Latin America. However, the Sisal court distinguished American Banana by
concluding that in Sisal-unlike American Banana-the relevant conspiracy was
entered into in the United States. For a general overview of these developments, see
Kramer, supra note 138, at 190-92.
146. For example, the Court in American Banana stated:
Law is a statement of the circumstances, in which the public force will be
brought to bear upon men through the courts. But the word commonly is
confined to such prophecies or threats when addressed to persons living within
the power of the courts. A threat that depends upon the choice of the party
affected to bring himself within that power hardly would be called law in the
ordinary sense.
213 U.S. at 357; see also id. ("In the case of the present statute, the improbability of the
United States attempting to make acts done in Panama or Costa Rica criminal is
obvious, yet the law begins by making criminal the acts for which it gives a right to
sue."). On the degree to which modern regulation of international business depends on
threats directed toward persons who may not live within the immediate power of the
court, see Adam I. Muchmore, International Activity and Domestic Law, 1 PENN ST.
J.L. & INT'L AFF. 363, 364-67 (2012) (discussing extraterritorial regulatory programs-
in the United States, the European Union, and China-based largely on the ability to
condition market access on compliance with regulatory requirements).
147. 148 F.2d. 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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tremendous political and economic importance.148 Perhaps because of
the case's importance, the Supreme Court was unable to secure a
quorum of six Justices necessary to decide the case and transferred it
to the Second Circuit for a final decisions. 149 In the Second Circuit,
Judge Learned Hand concluded that a foreign conspiracy with
economic effects in the United States was subject to U.S. antitrust
law.'50 Alcoa's adoption of the economic-effects doctrine set the stage
for deep conflicts between the United States and its major trading
partners during the Cold War era.151
Nearly forty years passed between Alcoa and the Supreme
Court's approval of extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California.152 During this time, the lower
courts struggled with a series of difficult questions of foreign and
economic policy. Some decisions dealt narrowly with specific fact
situations, while some tried to set out rule-like propositions. Perhaps
most famously, Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, NT. &
S.A. and its progeny set forth a forward-looking standard-a highly
indeterminate, multi-factor test-that permitted courts to take
account of virtually any factual or policy circumstance. 153 The
148. See WYATT WELLS, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 59-62
(2002) (describing the relationship of the Alcoa case to wartime demands for aluminum
following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor).
149. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 64 S. Ct. 73, 73 (1943)
(finding that disqualification of four Justices prevented a quorum); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 64 S. Ct. 1281, 1281 (1944) (per curiam) (transferring
the case to the Second Circuit for final disposition).
150. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 ("Both agreements would clearly have been unlawful,
had they been made within the United States; and it follows from what we have just
said that both were unlawful, though made abroad, if they were intended to affect
imports and did affect them.").
151. Perhaps the classic modern area of conflicts of jurisdiction is antitrust
law. The United Kingdom, Australia, and some other important
friendly countries simply do not accept the "effects test" as a legitimate
basis of jurisdiction to regulate economic conduct under international
law. The effects test was initially enunciated in Judge Learned Hand's
1945 Alcoa decision and is the first step in the jurisdictional analysis
performed by Federal courts today. It applies U.S. antitrust law to
conduct abroad having substantial, direct, and foreseeable effects on
U.S. domestic or foreign commerce.
Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 77 AM. SOC. INT'L L.
PROC. 370, 372 (1983).
152. 509 U.S. 764 (1993). On the Supreme Court affirming some antitrust cases
with foreign elements without explicitly approving of Alcoa-style extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act, see Kramer, supra note 138, at 193.
153. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). The court set out the following standard:
What we prefer is an evaluation and balancing of the relevant
considerations in each case in the words of Kingman Brewster, a "jurisdictional
rule of reason. .
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Timberlane factors found their way, somewhat modified, into the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States.154
The Restatement in turn played a role in the Supreme Court's
two recent international antitrust cases, Hartford Fire 155 and F.
Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A. 156 To many observers,
these decisions seemed to rest on conflicting theories. 5 7
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law
or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or
principal places of businesses or corporations, the extent to which enforcement
by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance
of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to
which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the
foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations
charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
A court evaluating these factors should identify the potential degree of conflict
if American authority is asserted. A difference in law or policy is one likely sore
spot, though one which may not always be present. Nationality is another;
though foreign governments may have some concern for the treatment of
American citizens and business residing there, they primarily care about their
own nationals. Having assessed the conflict, the court should then determine
whether in the face of it the contacts and interests of the United States are
sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 613-15. For an example of a well-known case following Timberlane, see
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
154. This modified version of the Timberlane standard was incorporated into
§ 403(2) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States. The text
of § 403(2) is set out supra note 20.
155. 509 U.S. § 764 (1993).
156. 542 U.S. § 155 (2004).
157. In Hartford Fire, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, refused to engage in
the standard-like balancing approach of Timberlane and the Restatement (Third). 509
U.S. at 798. The majority determined that standard-like balancing was not required
because the defendants had not made a showing that complying with U.S. law would
require them to violate British law. Id. at 798-99. A dissent by Justice Scalia-
normally a proponent of bright-line rules, see Scalia, supra note 21, at 1179-argued
that the Court was required to engage in standard-like balancing in this situation. 509
U.S. at 814-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia reached this result in five steps.
First, he asserted that prior Supreme Court decisions had overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality with respect to U.S. antitrust law. Id. at 814. Second, he
asserted that, in addition to the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court was
required to apply the presumption that Congress intends to comply with international
law. Id. at 814-15. Third, he assumed without deciding that the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations of the United States-including § 403(2)-set out the relevant rules
of international law. Id. at 818. Fourth, he recast several decisions appearing to apply
judicial comity (which he calls "the comity of courts") as instead applying legislative
comity (which he calls "prescriptive comity"). Id. at 817-20. Finally, Justice Scalia
concluded that the Sherman Act should not be construed as applying to the Hartford
Fire facts. Id. at 819. In sum:
Rarely would these factors point more clearly against application of United
States law. The activity relevant to the counts at issue here took place
primarily in the United Kingdom, and the defendants in these counts are
British corporations and British subjects having their principal place of
business or residence outside the United States. Great Britain has established
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During this entire period-over half a century since Alcoa-the
Sherman Act functioned in effect as a potentially extraterritorial
standard. It applied in situations where the facts were sufficiently
tied to the United States; it did not apply in situations where the
facts were not sufficiently tied to the United States.
It has appeared far more likely to apply when the United States
government brings an enforcement action, but even that may not be
an outright rule. The rarity with which the government has brought
criminal antitrust claims against foreign nationals suggests some
desire not to risk bringing a weak case that could result in a negative
precedent.' 5 8
A. Rules, Standards, and Extraterritoriality Precedents
Leading precedents in antitrust, securities, and employment
cases suggest that the choice between rules and standards plays a
significant role. In antitrust, the Sherman Act was passed during the
heyday of territorial theories of state power. 159 Early decisions
confined the antitrust laws to U.S. territory.160 However, the famous
a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the London reinsurance
markets, and clearly has a "heavy interest in regulating the
activity["] .... Considering these factors, I think it unimaginable that an
assertion of legislative jurisdiction by the United States would be considered
reasonable, and therefore it is inappropriate to assume, in the absence of
statutory indication to the contrary, that Congress has made such an assertion.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Eleven years later, the Supreme Court handed down its Empagran decision.
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, began with a slight rephrasing of the
presumption that Congress does not intend to violate international law: "[T]his court
normally construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the
sovereign authority of other nations." F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,
542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). For this proposition, Justice Breyer cited, among other
sources, Justice Scalia's Hartford Fire dissenting opinion. Id. Justice Breyer then
proceeded to conduct the type of standard-like balancing rejected by the Hartford Fire
majority -(but recommended by Justice Scalia's Hartford Fire dissent). Id. For
comments by other observers, see, e.g., Developments in the Law-Extraterritoriality:
V Comity and Extraterritoriality in Antitrust Enforcement, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1269,
1272-73 (2011); Max Huffman, A Retrospective on Twenty-Five Years of the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 44 Hous. L. REV. 285, 321-23 (2007); Wolfgang
Wurmnest, Foreign Private Plaintiffs, Global Conspiracies, and the Extraterritorial
Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law, 28 HASTINGSINT'L & COMP. L. REV. 205, 218-220.
158. Cf. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997)
(reversing the district court judgment and reinstating criminal antitrust claims against
foreign company).
159. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1878) (territorial theory of
personal jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAw (1934) (territorial
theory of choice of law); Kramer, supra note 138, at 187-89 (describing how
territoriality was the cornerstone of the political and legal framework during this time
period).
160. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909) (finding
that the complaint did not state a cause of action because "[a] conspiracy in this
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1945 Alcoa decision asserted broad authority-in a somewhat rule-
like manner-over foreign conspiracies with effects in the United
States.16 1 Foreign companies and their governments fought back, and
by the late 1970s a number of federal circuit courts had shifted to
standards in extraterritorial decision making. 162 These standards
went beyond determining whether a U.S. court has jurisdiction under
Alcoa's effects test to whether the court should exercise that
jurisdiction in light of factors such as international comity and
fairness, the potential effects on U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy,
and the relative importance of the allegedly unlawful conduct
domestically compared to abroad.163 The Supreme Court stayed out of
fights over the extraterritorial scope of the Sherman Act until the
Hartford Fire decision in 1993, where it gave what might be
considered a qualified endorsement of the use of standards to
determine the scope of the Sherman Act.164 A broader endorsement
followed with the Empagran decision in 2004. 165 The opposing
outcomes of the Hartford Fire and Empagran analyses, which have
appeared contradictory to many observers, make more sense when
viewed simply as decisions holding that a standard, rather than a
rule, should be used to decide the territorial scope of U.S. antitrust
law.166
Moving from antitrust to securities law, there appears to have
been a period of time where the presumption against
country to do acts in another jurisdiction does not draw to itself those acts and make
them unlawful, if they are permitted by the local law").
161. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-45 (2d Cir.
1945). This is rule-like in that Judge Learned Hand indicates that U.S. laws apply
abroad as long as Congress intends that they do so. He does not include any exception
for reasonableness, balancing of interests, etc. See id.
162. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1976) (applying a standard-like approach); Mannington Mills, Inc. v
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296 (3d Cir. 1979) (adopting Timberlane's standard-
like approach);.
163. See, e.g., Mannington Mill, 595 F.2d at 1301 (urging U.S. courts not to
"ignore the fact that foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and limitations of judicial
power" should be taken into account when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction in
matters involving foreign nations); Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 597 (providing an array of
factors a court should consider when deciding whether to exercise "extraterritorial
jurisdiction").
164. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (declining to
address whether a comity-based exception exists to the reach of the Sherman Act, but
concluding that if such an exception existed, it would not apply to the facts then before
the Court). This is a qualified endorsement because it did not outright reject standard-
based balancing, but concluded it was not necessary on the facts of the case. For
additional information on Hartford Fire, see supra note 157.
165. See 542 U.S. 155, 173-74 (2004) (using comity analysis to conclude that the
Sherman Act, as modified by the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act, did not
apply to foreign price fixing insofar as it affected prices in foreign markets).
166. See supra note 157 (detailing the analyses performed by the Hartford Fire
and Empagran courts).
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extraterritoriality was applied fairly generally as an
antiextraterritoriality interpretive rule.167 However, in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, the Second Circuit switched to a standard-based
approach, concluding that it would apply the antifraud provisions of
the securities laws to transactions that had significant effects on U.S.
markets 168 or that involved significant conduct in the United
States.169 This combination of an "effects test" and a "conduct test"170
(with either being independently sufficient to sustain extraterritorial
application) was adopted with some variation by several other
circuits.171 While exact formulations differed, it appears that each
was generally applied as a policy-oriented balancing test. 172 This
balancing came to an end with the recent Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd. decision, which returned to an
antiextraterritoriality interpretive rule for the U.S. securities laws.173
Congress responded with what is apparently a partial overruling of
Morrison in the Dodd-Frank Act.174
167. See Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010)
(making this observation with respect to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York).
168. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) ("We
believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in
order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American
exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper
foreign transactions in American securities." (emphasis added)).
169. Conduct within the territory alone would seem sufficient from the
standpoint of jurisdiction to prescribe a rule. It follows that when, as
here, there has been significant conduct within the territory, a statute
cannot properly be held inapplicable simply on the ground that, absent
the clearest language, Congress will not be assumed to have meant to go
beyond the limits recognized by foreign relations law.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972)
(original emphasis omitted and emphasis added).
170. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879 (internal quotations omitted).
171. See id. at 2880 ("Other Circuits embraced the Second Circuit's approach,
though not its precise application.").
172. Id.
173. See id. at 2880-81 (finding the criticisms put forth regarding the
"unpredictable and inconsistent application" of the Securities and Exchange Act to
transnational cases justified and returning to the "presumption against
extraterritoriality"). The Morrison decision did not outright prohibit extraterritorial
application of U.S. law. It simply reaffirmed that the Supreme Court-at least the one
that existed at the time of the Morrison decision-intended to apply the presumption
against extraterritoriality as a strict clear-statement rule. See id. at 2881 ("Rather
than guess anew in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a
stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.").
174. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862-65 (2010). The provision purports to
overrule Morrison with respect to suits brought by the U.S. Department of Justice and
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, but not by private plaintiffs. Differing
views have been expressed as to whether § 929P was drafted in a manner that will in
fact accomplish this purpose. Compare Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank
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In employment law, an early case applying an
antiextraterritoriality interpretive rule17 5 gave way to standards in
the 1950s.17 6 In Lauritzen v. Larsen, a Jones Act case involving an
injured seaman, the Court applied a general balancing test to
determine that Danish rather than U.S. law applied to a maritime
tort. 177 In Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., the Court
purported to apply Lauritzen, but adopted the more rule-like
proposition that claims between a seaman and his home-country
employer should be governed by the law of their common domicile.178
A switch back to standards followed in Hellinic Lines v. Rhoditis,
with the Court emphasizing that the Lauritzen test was "not a
mechanical one" and that the factors it listed were "not intended as
exhaustive."1 79 The Court returned to the more rule-like presumption
against extraterritoriality in the 1991 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Company (Aramco) case, but Congress responded by substituting an
extraterritorial rule for the Supreme Court's decision reading U.S.
antidiscrimination law as a territorially limited rule.1 80 More simply,
Congress indicated that it was rebutting the presumption against
extraterritoriality for U.S. citizens working for U.S. companies
abroad.1 8
Looking at the antitrust, securities, and employment cases
together, it appears that the use of standards has been the dominant
approach to the Court's decisions on the extraterritorial scope of U.S.
law. While there is a contingent on the Court with a preference for
antiextraterritoriality interpretive rules (victorious in Aramco and
Morrison), those rules effectively lose their rule-like character when
not applied consistently. A situation in which it is impossible to
predict ex ante whether an outcome-determinative rule will be
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV.
Bus. L. REV. 195, 229 (2011) (suggesting that § 929P may not succeed in partially
overruling Morrison), with Stephan, Extraterritoriality, supra note 53, at 14 n.20
(speculating that courts will overlook any poor drafting in § 929P and apply it as
partially overruling Morrison).
175. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1925) (applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality).
176. See Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (using the
standards established in Lauritzen); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (taking
into account multiple factors to determine the applicable law).
177. See Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 591-93 (applying a general balancing test
similar to the New York weighing-of-contacts approach in choice of law).
178. 358 U.S. at 384.
179. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1970).
180. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071,
1077 (1991) (amending the "DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE" in the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 to include: "With respect to
employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of
the United States").
181. See id.; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 110, at 283 (describing how the
Aramco decision was overridden by Congress less than one year later).
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applied is effectively a standard. Accordingly, the Court's recent
Morrison decision does not demonstrate a return to rules in Supreme
Court extraterritoriality decision making. 182 That will not occur until
the Court demonstrates that the rule purportedly announced in
Morrison will govern in some identifiable subset of future cases.
B. The Extraterritoriality Spectrum
Another reason for the tendency to use standards in
extraterritoriality cases is that the fact situations that arise lend
themselves to this type of analysis. The question of whether a fact
situation should be treated as extraterritorial is difficult to
conceptualize in a binary manner without arbitrary reliance on what
Brilmayer and Anglin call (in the domestic choice-of-law context) a
"single-factor trigger."1 83
When private actors are going about their daily business, they
are frequently engaging in transactions that involve a combination of
domestic and foreign actors and a combination of activities that can
be categorized as domestic, foreign, and-as is often the case with
cross-border communications-somewhere in between. When a
dispute arises, the question of whether it is foreign or domestic likely
depends on which of the actors originally involved in the transaction
are now involved in the dispute and on which of the various activities
involved in the transaction or series of transactions relate to the
dispute. In other words, real-life situations exist on a spectrum
between those that can be categorized as purely domestic and those
that can be categorized as purely foreignlextraterritorial. (See Figure
4, below.)
Purely domestic fact situations are easy-U.S. domestic laws
apply. Purely foreign situations are not easy, but arise less
frequently. Even extraterritorial rules may not purport to apply to
purely foreign fact situations, and it is rare for a defendant in a
purely foreign dispute to be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
United States.184 But the vast majority of situations that arise in U.S.
courts fall somewhere in between.
182. On the rule adopted in Morrison, see supra note 173 and accompanying
text.
183. See BRILMAYER & ANGLIN, supra note 52, at 1146-47. In conflict of laws
more generally, there is a long-standing tension between focusing on the location that
has the strongest connection to the parties to the litigation (typically residence,
domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation) and focusing on the location that
has the strongest connection to the events that led to the particular dispute (place of
accident, place of contracting, location of property, or place where a marriage is
celebrated). See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 17-18 (1991)).
184. The Alien Tort Statute may be an exception, as it does not appear to
require a connection to the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district
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Up to this point, the wide variations in potential situations that
can arise has prevented a consensus from forming on any set of rule-
like criteria for determining either when a situation crosses over from
"domestic" to "foreign" or when a "foreign" case has enough domestic
ties to make application of U.S. law appropriate.
Accordingly, a significant impetus for the continuing presence of
standards in U.S. extraterritoriality case law is the wide variation in
fact situations that can arise. This structural classification problem
arises even when looking at extraterritoriality cases from a purely
doctrinal perspective. The problem is compounded when variations in
state political, economic, and military power are brought into the
equation.
Figure 4-The Extraterritoriality Spectrum
Purely Domestic Purely Foreign
(or extraterritorial)
C. Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Extraterritorial Regulation
Whatever their general views on the relative desirability of rules
and standards, institutional actors may have specific preferences for
rules or standards in extraterritoriality decision making. A major
reason for this is that extraterritorial application of U.S. law
systematically favors plaintiffs in private civil litigation. As discussed
earlier, almost all Supreme Court decisions on extraterritoriality
matters have been made in cases when one private party sues
another private party.185 They all involve private rights of action
under federal regulatory schemes. Partly for jurisdictional reasons,
courts faced with a lawsuit under federal antitrust, securities, or
employment law do not engage in the familiar choice-of-law process
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
185. The one notable exception was the Supreme Court's nondecision in the
Alcoa case-where four Justices recused themselves and the Court, unable to secure a
quorum, was forced to transfer the case back to the Second Circuit for a decision.
Writing for the Second Circuit panel, Judge Learned Hand found in favor of the
plaintiff-which happened to be the U.S. government-on the extraterritoriality issue.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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that courts (state or federal) use when faced with a case in torts,
contracts, or other common-law field.
In those common-law fields, courts are faced with deciding which
of two or more bodies of law to apply. For example, a court faced with
a tort suit involving two Pennsylvania residents who got into a car
wreck in Canada would have to choose whether to apply
Pennsylvania tort law or the tort law of the relevant Canadian
province. By contrast, a court faced with a suit under U.S. federal
regulatory law involving events in Canada will not make a decision
whether to apply U.S. or Canadian law. It will instead determine
whether to apply U.S. law or dismiss the case. 186
The question of whether U.S. law applies to extraterritorial
activity is completely separate from the question of whether another
court could apply some other body of law to that activity. It also
means that a decision of a U.S. court to apply U.S. law
extraterritorially is extremely unlikely to help the defendant. 87
The pro-plaintiff bias created by the U.S-law-or-dismiss choice-
of-law decision is compounded by both structural aspects of U.S.
litigation and specific remedies included in frequently litigated
regulatory statutes. Structurally, plaintiffs have several advantages
in U.S. courts that they enjoy in few other court systems. These
include broad discovery provisions, the "American rule" that the loser
does not pay the winner's attorney's fees, the ability to bring
litigation under contingent-fee arrangements, and the ability to
obtain punitive damages. Beyond these pro-plaintiff provisions, some
statutes structured as potentially extraterritorial standards have
damage provisions that incentivize private litigation. The treble
damages provision of the antitrust laws provides perhaps the best-
known example.
Given that extraterritorial application of U.S. law carries these
pro-plaintiff consequences, institutional actors who have reservations
about the plaintiff versus defendant balance in U.S. litigation may be
disinclined to see broad regulatory statutes interpreted as applying
extraterritorially in a rule-like manner. However, those same
institutional actors might also be disinclined to completely remove
extraterritorial scope from federal regulatory statutes. This might be
the case, for instance, if they believed territorially limited application
186. See generally Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 134, at 1232 (observing this
differing treatment and noting that it cannot be fully explained by the limited
jurisdiction of federal courts).
187. It would appear that the only possible benefit would be the potential
preclusive effect that a U.S. court's judgment in favor of the defendant might have in
later proceedings. However, it seems relatively unlikely that a foreign court would
conclude that a judgment of nonliability under U.S. regulatory law would preclude
liability for regulatory proceedings under foreign law.
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of the statute might disadvantage U.S. companies vis-A-vis their
foreign competitors.
VI. STRUCTURING LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: RULES, STANDARDS, AND
LEGISLATIVE DELEGATION
Having examined the role that the distinction between rules and
standards has played in extraterritoriality precedents in the previous
Part, this Part examines the way basic incentive structures are likely
to influence institutional preferences for rules or for standards. This
analysis proceeds from a consequentialist perspective founded in
public-choice theory. Accordingly, institutional preferences are
assumed not to exist separately from the preferences of their
individual members, and individual members are assumed to act in a
way that maximizes their individual welfare.
A. Instrumental Perspectives and Nonrepeat Players
From this public-choice perspective, support by nonrepeat
players for either rules or standards may depend significantly on
instrumental considerations. Once involved in a dispute, the basic
preference ordering for individuals is likely to be: (1) rule I like/rule
that helps me; (2) standard; (3) rule I don't like/rule that hurts me.
Faced with a legal provision that could be interpreted as either a rule
or standard, an individual will favor a rule if the rule-like
interpretation will help him but will favor a standard if the rule-like
interpretation is unlikely to help. In other words, arguing for a
standard is a classic strategy for situations where a rule-like
interpretation is unfavorable.
B. Repeat Players, Regulators, and Principal-Agent Problems
The preference ordering works out differently for repeat players
and for individuals charged with responsibility for controlling the acts
of others. Repeat players are concerned less with the outcome of an
individual dispute than with the aggregate outcome of all current and
future disputes. 188 Accordingly, repeat players must consider not only
how a rule or standard will influence the current dispute, but also
how it will influence foreseeable future disputes.
Similarly, those with regulatory responsibility must consider
how a rule or standard will influence foreseeable future cases. This is
where the classic advantages and disadvantages of each legal form
become relevant. Rules provide certainty and reduce principal-agent
188. With future disputes discounted to their present value.
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problems, but have high upfront costs and can produce arbitrary
results. Standards provide flexibility, as well as justice in the
individual case, but reduce certainty, increase principal-agent
problems, result in high decision costs at the point of application, and
can create the appearance of like cases not being treated alike.
Whether a regulator prefers rules or standards for particular
regulatory areas will depend in part on a judgment about whether
rules or standards offer more efficient regulatory options for the
particular regulatory area. However, it may also depend in significant
part on the regulator's worldview. A regulator preferring certainty
and equality before the law will likely lean toward rules. A regulator
preferring justice in each individual case will likely lean toward
standards.
Finally, a regulator who dislikes-but is unable to change-the
content of the rule will prefer a standard. In this way, standards are
a classic form of compromise. Two sides that want diametrically
opposed rules will often agree on a standard. This is both a way of
moving past an issue that could bar a more important agreement and
a way of delegating the choice of outcomes to a future decision maker
instead of determining them in advance.
C. Optional Delegation of Legislative Authority
The decision between rules and standards takes on an additional
level of complication in a multibranch government. In the U.S. federal
system, legislators have three basic choices on the rule/standard
spectrum: (1) they can structure a requirement as a rule, preserving
maximum legislative control; (2) they can structure a requirement as
a standard, delegating the process of filling in details to the judiciary;
or (3) they can delegate the process of filling in details to the
executive, allowing the relevant agency to promulgate regulations
using whatever mix of rules and standards it deems appropriate.
At first blush, it might seem that most legislators would prefer to
choose option one, structuring legal requirements as rules in order to
preserve maximum legislative control. But this approach runs up
against several costs. Rules are more costly than standards to draft,
as they require anticipation of possible fact situations in advance.
Rules are also likely to be more costly to pass, because-to the extent
that there are those that the chosen rules disfavor-opponents are
more likely to mobilize against a rule that will always disfavor them
than against a standard that will sometimes disfavor them. Rules
also place responsibility-for good or for ill--on the legislators who
voted for them. Finally, statute-based rules risk locking in a policy
that a legislator (or the legislator's constituents) might not like as
much in the future as in the present.
These drawbacks should in some cases lead the legislator to
choose to delegate the details of legal requirements to either the
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judiciary or the executive. A delegation to the judiciary requires the
legislature to structure the statute as a standard, but permits the
judiciary to fill in-on a case-by-case basis-the details with either
rule-like or standard-like requirements. A delegation to the executive
is also likely to be done through a statute structured as a standard,
which typically leads the executive to promulgate a set of regulations
combining rule-like and standard-like requirements.
A legislator's decision between situations in which the cost of a
statute-based rule are worthwhile and situations in which a standard
is preferable (delegating to the executive or the judiciary) is likely to
depend, in significant part, on the way those two other branches are
expected to exercise discretion. A delegation to the executive is more
predictable the longer it is until the next presidential election.
Beyond the duration of the current presidential term, however, a
delegation to the executive is highly unpredictable.
Delegation to the executive also empowers different decision
makers in different interest groups as compared to a rule-like
requirement in the statutory text. Even when writing a rule in the
statutory text, a member of Congress does not preserve power for
himself, but for a future legislative majority. Changing a statute-
based rule requires following a particular procedural path, typically
empowering members of Congress with gatekeeping roles (committee
chairs and party leaders) to exercise significant influence on whether
a change is made and the content of any such change. This also
empowers those lobbying groups who are effective in influencing large
groups of Congress members-most likely those with deep pockets or
significant grassroots support in key congressional districts.
By contrast, delegation to the executive establishes a different
path for legal change. This instead puts the power to determine the
content of law in the hands of career bureaucracies working under
the direction of political appointees. 189 This empowers lobbying
groups effective in influencing the regulatory process.
In the U.S. constitutional structure, there is, of course, always a
give and take between the three branches. Any contested application
of the law requires a court proceeding, so the judiciary will have some
interpretive role-even with rule-like requirements-in borderline
situations. A court sufficiently convinced that a rule is harsh, unfair,
or not sufficiently in the public interest can use aggressive judicial
interpretation to transform seemingly rule-like requirements into
standards. This is amply illustrated by the Supreme Court's First
189. Although the dynamic will of course vary somewhat between statutorily
independent and nonindependent agencies, the overall idea is the same.
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Amendment jurisprudence, which has repeatedly transformed
requirements that are at least arguably rule-like into standards.19 0
Similarly, the executive retains some authority to influence the
degree to which a rule-like statutory requirement affects primary
behavior. To the extent the executive is given enforcement authority,
it can choose to enforce a statute in any manner, from aggressively to
not at all.
D. Mandatory Delegation of Enforcement Authority
In addition to authority to fill in the details of substantive
requirements, legislators must also make another delegation decision.
They must choose whether to delegate enforcement authority to the
executive, to private parties, or to some combination of the two.
The result of the decision to delegate enforcement authority to
the executive is, like a delegation of legislative authority,
proportionally more predictable the further it is until the next
presidential election. It can, however, also result in a statute being
enforced very selectively or not at all because of the substantial
discretion the executive has in determining how to utilize its
enforcement resources. 191 A delegation to the executive also puts
enforcement costs on the government and is likely to result in a lower
level of enforcement than if private parties are also empowered to
bring enforcement actions.
A decision to delegate enforcement authority in whole or in part
to private parties results in a very different enforcement scheme. This
delegation occurs by giving injured parties the authority to file a civil
lawsuit to enforce the statute's provisions. 192 In some ways, this
approach creates a highly predictable enforcement regime. Private
parties-especially those operating for profit-are likely to respond to
190. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. Despite the rule-like nature of these provisions, the Supreme
Court has used standard-like balancing tests in free-speech cases. See, e.g., Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'r, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980) (setting out
a standard-like balancing test for commercial-speech cases); Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147, 151 (1939) (setting out a standard-like balancing approach in handbill
distribution cases); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 37, at 944 & n.3 (noting the role of
standard-like balancing tests in free-speech cases); Schlag, supra note 37, at 394-98
(same).
191. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985) (concluding that the
Administrative Procedure Act did not provide for judicial review of an agency decision
not to take enforcement action).
192. These have come to be known as "private attorney general" provisions. See
generally Hannah Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public
Interests in Private International Antitrust Adjudication, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219 (2001)
(examining the role of the private attorney general in international litigation).
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incentives and file suits when they believe the benefits exceed the
costs. Delegation of enforcement to private parties is also a way of
disconnecting enforcement policy from the political control of the
executive.
E. Interest Groups and the Rule/Standard Decision
Another factor that could contribute to the persistence of
standards may relate to interest groups concerned with
extraterritorial regulation. A comprehensive interest-group analysis
goes beyond the scope of this Article, but the discussion of two
important interest groups-domestic businesses and domestic
lawyers-should offer the flavor of the way interest-group pressures
can intersect with the distinction between rules and standards on
extraterritoriality. Here standards play two primary roles: (1) as a
compromise between those who favor and those who oppose
extraterritorial regulation in a particular area and (2) as a factor that
can raise litigation costs in a way that benefits defendant-side
lawyers and harms plaintiff-side lawyers. 93
1. Business Groups
Because extraterritorial application of U.S. law operates in a pro-
plaintiff manner, business groups are likely to oppose extraterritorial
application of U.S. securities law. This is because businesses are more
likely to be defendants than plaintiffs in securities fraud actions.194
The case is more equivocal with respect to U.S. labor and
employment law. Business groups are more likely to find themselves
as defendants rather than plaintiffs in employment and labor cases,
but that may not be their only concern. In addition to individual
defendants, business groups are concerned with the relative labor
costs they pay vis-A-vis their foreign competitors. Domestic business
groups are already required to comply with U.S. law in their U.S.
operations, so their main vulnerability to extraterritorial labor and
employment suits involves employees (U.S. citizen and alien) in their
foreign operations. To the extent that businesses already comply with
U.S. labor and employment laws in their domestic and foreign
operations, they may see extraterritorial application of U.S. law as
something that would impose costs on their competitors but cause
them little harm.
193. Plaintiff-side lawyers working on hourly fees (which, in the United States,
is most likely to be those representing large corporate entities) may often face
incentives closer to those identified in this discussion with defendant-side lawyers.
194. A significant exception would be companies (especially privately held
companies) that purchase securities of other companies as part of their normal
business.
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The situation differs with respect to antitrust laws. U.S.
businesses know they are subject to U.S. antitrust law, both in their
domestic and in their foreign operations. They also know that many
of their competitors operate in places where antitrust laws are weak,
nonexistent, or largely unenforced. 1 9 5 Accordingly, U.S. businesses
are far more likely to find themselves as plaintiffs in antitrust cases
than in securities or employment cases. 196 Moreover, even those
businesses that do not find themselves as antitrust plaintiffs may
benefit from having their foreign competitors subject to a regulatory
scheme equivalent to their own.
In other words, businesses in the United States might have a
very different view about the extraterritorial application of antitrust
law than about the existence of antitrust law itself. Although there
are almost certainly business groups who would prefer not to have
any U.S. antitrust law at all, those with significant operations in the
United States should typically prefer that-if antitrust law is going to
exist-it apply to foreign competitors as well.
2. Lawyers
Another interest group highly relevant to extraterritoriality
lawmaking is the legal profession. Lawyers may be involved in
lobbying in two primary capacities. They may lobby on behalf of their
own financial interests as a profession, and they may be hired to
lobby on behalf of their clients.
Extraterritorial application of federal regulatory law should
generally favor the interests of U.S. lawyers as a profession. At the
most basic level, lawsuits and enforcement actions in the United
States require the hiring of U.S. lawyers. The remaining effects break
down to some extent between plaintiff-side and defendant-side
lawyers, 197 but there is one point where the incentive structures
converge: having at least some degree of extraterritorial application of
U.S. law. As explained further below, plaintiff-side lawyers are likely
195. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Ministry of Commerce of China in
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 5, In re Vitamin C
Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1738, 2011 WL 197583 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2011) (asserting
that an alleged cartel was "a regulatory pricing regime mandated by the government of
China-a regime instituted to ensure orderly markets during China's transition to a
market-driven economy and to promote, in this transitional period, the profitability of
the industry through coordination of pricing and control of export volumes").
196. While some antitrust cases are brought by consumers, others are brought
by competitors of the alleged cartel or monopolist.
197. It is, of course, an oversimplification to divide the legal profession simply
into plaintiff-side and defendant-side work. Many lawyers do both types of work,
depending on the specific needs of their clients of time. However, there is enough of a
general division in the profession to make this rough distinction useful for analytical
purposes.
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to favor extraterritorial rules, while defendant-side lawyers are likely
to favor potentially extraterritorial standards, but both should be able
to agree that some degree of extraterritoriality benefits their financial
interests.
One initial division is that plaintiff-side lawyers benefit when a
statute either contains an explicit private right of action or, if
ambiguous, is judicially interpreted to contain an implied private
right of action. Under current judicial interpretations, this means the
plaintiff-side lawyers can benefit from the existence of the Sherman
Act,19 8 § 10(b) the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,199 the Racketeer-
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,200 and the Lanham Act. 201
They cannot, however, derive a direct financial benefit from publicly
enforced statutes such as the FCPA. For each of these statutes,
plaintiff-side lawyers as a class will prefer extraterritorial rules over
potentially extraterritorial standards (and, of course, territorially
limited rules). This is because a statute structured as an
extraterritorial rule will increase (often substantially) the expected
value of a plaintiffs claim.202
The expected value is higher with an extraterritorial rule than a
potentially extraterritorial standard for two reasons. The likelihood of
recovery is higher with an extraterritorial rule because there is little
or no uncertainty that the statute will be applicable abroad.20 3 The
costs of litigation are also lower with an extraterritorial rule than
with a potentially extraterritorial standard because standards are
fact-intensive to'litigate and often require substantial discovery
before an initial determination as to the applicability of the relevant
law can be made. A plaintiff-side lawyer who takes cases on
contingent fees directly bears these additional discovery costs. They
are entirely unrecoverable if the case is lost, whether by dismissal,
summary judgment, or after a trial. Under the American Rule on
attorney's fees, the vast majority of these discovery costs remain
unrecoverable even in the case of trial victory. 204 Accordingly, a
statute structured as a potentially extraterritorial standard will
produce fewer cases that are financially viable for plaintiff-side
lawyers than a similar statute structured as an extraterritorial rule.
By contrast, defendant-side lawyers face a differing set of
incentives. First, defendant-side lawyers as a class benefit from
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
199. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2006).
200. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006).
202. On calculating the expected value of a case, see ROBERT G. BONE, THE
EcoNOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 20-29 (2003).
203. Of course, this would not be the case if the rule is nonfavorable to the
plaintiff.
204. Though they may, of course, be recouped out of the proceeds of a settlement
or an attorney's share of a court verdict.
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extraterritorial statutes whether or not they contain a private right of
action. A defendant-side lawyer is needed whether the government or
a private party brings an enforcement action. 205
Second, defendant-side lawyers strongly favor a potentially
extraterritorial standard over an extraterritorial rule (and over a
territorially limited rule). 206 The cost structure of discovery
dramatically differs for a defendant-side lawyer than for a plaintiff-
side lawyer. For a defendant-side lawyer working under the
traditional hourly fee arrangement, discovery costs are revenue, pure
and simple. The more discovery is necessary in a case, the more the
defendant's lawyer earns.
TL.se considerations suggest that lawyers, as a class, are likely
to favor some degree of extraterritorial regulation. Measured against
no regulation of the relevant field, extraterritorial regulation
(through civil lawsuits or public enforcement actions) creates clients
who would not otherwise need to hire lawyers. Measured against
regulation of an activity by the country in which it takes place,
extraterritorial regulation by the U.S. government means that clients
will need to hire U.S. lawyers rather than foreign lawyers.
F. Rules, Standards, and International Economic Policy
A general policy to treat the extraterritorial scope of federal
statutes as standards rather than rules is not an indefensible view of
international economic policy. 207 Standards can permit the courts to
allow extraterritorial applications for cases in which it seems
appropriate and curtail them for those situations in which it does not.
They can permit broader extraterritorial scope for enforcement
actions brought by the government than for enforcement actions
brought by private parties. And they can provide a degree of
uncertainty for both parties that encourages settlement rather than
protracted litigation. Of course, the use of standards to permit courts
to resolve cases based on their individual facts presents the concern
that all standards raise-that consideration of individual
circumstances results in like cases not being treated alike.
205. Of course, clients will often choose different lawyers for government
enforcement actions in private civil litigation.
206. To the extent defendant-side lawyers are hired to lobby for a territorially
limited rule, this creates a natural principal-agent problem. With a territorially
limited rule, the services of defendant-side lawyers and firms are no longer needed in
the relevant situation.
207. This is the view that Kenneth Dam appears to advocate for antitrust law,
first as Deputy Secretary of State in the Reagan Administration, and later after
returning to academic life. Dam, supra note 151, at 376; Kenneth W. Dam,
Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT.
REV. 289, 293 (1993).
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Yet rules also raise problems in the extraterritoriality context
that would not be unreasonable for institutional actors to consider.
First, the question of whether a dispute between a U.S. company and
a Chinese or Russian company is a "like case" to an otherwise similar
dispute between a U.S. company and a company in a small,
developing country does not have an obvious answer. It is a question
that may implicate views of both political theory and power politics.
Second, rules provide a focal point for foreign interest groups who
favor or oppose the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Each time
the Supreme Court grants certiorari in an extraterritoriality case
(each of which can potentially announce a rule), numerous foreign
governments file amicus briefS20 8 and likely also engage in more
informal efforts to influence the executive branch's position. Unlike
rules, standards neither preclude courts from considering geopolitical
ramifications nor provide the same focal point for interest-group
opposition. These problems may help to explain the persistence of
standards in extraterritoriality decision making, despite the
frustrating lack of guidance they provide to private actors about the
specifics of their legal obligations.
VII. STABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY
This Part discusses two analytical issues that arise from the
preceding analysis. Part VII.A suggests that the three types of
interpretive methods used for potentially extraterritorial standards
may have different levels of stability over time. Part VII.B explains
that uncertainty may have underappreciated value in extraterritorial
regulation, making it possible to do things with potentially
extraterritorial standards that cannot be done with extraterritorial
rules.
A. Stability: Interpretive Methods
Proextraterritoriality interpretive methods are likely to be less
stable (or less consistently applied) than antiextraterritoriality or
territorially neutral interpretive methods. This occurs because
proextraterritoriality methods face two practical problems. First, they
motivate foreign interest groups to become involved in lobbying
(either Congress or the executive directly, or the courts through
208. Cf. Ralf Michaels, Empagran's Empire: International Law and Statutory
Interpretation in the U.S. Supreme Court of the Twenty-First Century, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 533, 536
(David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011) (noting that seven
foreign governments filed amicus briefs at the Supreme Court level in the Empagran
case).
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amicus briefs and law-reform efforts) against U.S. interference with
foreign regulatory systems. Second, they are perceived as vulnerable
to the criticism that judicial implementation of antiextraterritoriality
clear statement requirements-as was done in the Supreme Court's
1991 Aramco and 2010 Morrison decisions-can remove the courts
from making decisions about the territorial scope of U.S. law.
There is some reason to think that antiextraterritoriality
interpretive methods may be more stable, over the long term, than
proextraterritoriality interpretive methods. Interest groups affected
by extraterritorial enforcement actions are likely to consist of several
components: those directly affected; those similarly situated who
believe they could be affected by a similar, future action; those foreign
interests who are opposed more generally to extraterritorial
regulation; and those domestic interests who are opposed more
generally to extraterritorial regulation (perhaps for fear of similar
action by other states).
By contrast, proextraterritoriality interpretive methods may be
supported by a more limited set of interests groups. These can include
domestic interests benefitted by the extraterritorial action, foreign
interests benefitted by the relevant extraterritorial action, those
domestic interests in favor of a world-policeman type of role, and
those foreign interests that doubt their own government's ability to
achieve the regulatory objective (e.g., citizens of corrupt states on
bribery issues).
The stability of extraterritorial regulatory programs may also
depend on the size of the regulating states. Extraterritorial
regulation is both financially and geopolitically costly, and a state's
ability to enforce a particular extraterritorial regulation may depend
significantly on the importance its market or territory holds for
foreign states, businesses, or civil society. The United States and the
European Union can both exercise significant extraterritorial
antitrust authority because their markets are too important for many
companies to avoid. Because the effectiveness of extraterritorial
regulation depends substantially on the threat of territorial or
market exclusion, smaller, less financially or geopolitically significant
states should have more trouble maintaining stable extraterritorial
regulatory programs.
This does not, of course, prevent a small state from engaging in
extraterritorial regulatory efforts in one-of-a-kind situations
sufficiently important to the small state. For example, the young
state of Israel succeeded in abducting Adolf Eichmann from
Argentina and prosecuting him for acts taken in Germany before
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Israel became a state.209 Similarly, a medium power such as France
was able to sink a Greenpeace vessel at harbor in New Zealand before
a planned protest of French nuclear testing. 210 While both states
faced international ramifications for their actions, they each
succeeded in accomplishing what was (at least at the time)
apparently an objective of their governments. 211
B. Uncertainty as a Regulatory Tool
Should government regulators be troubled by the natural push
toward standards in extraterritoriality decision making? That
depends on their regulatory objectives. While there are certainly costs
associated with uncertainty, from an individual institutional actor's
perspective, there are reasons to think that the benefits could at
times exceed the costs. Specifically, the uncertainty associated with
standards does two things that are difficult to do in a rule-based
enforcement structure. First, it provides a mechanism for self-
calibration of enforcement levels, especially when a private right of
action exists. Second, it provides a way of discouraging the most
egregious of the activities targeted by the statute-even when an
actual enforcement action would be likely to cause significant foreign-
affairs problems.
1. Self-Adjusting Enforcement Levels
In statutory schemes with a private right of action, the executive
does not have the ability to control enforcement levels in the way that
it does in a statutory scheme that is enforced only by the government.
In this type of statutory scheme, standards may provide necessary
flexibility in an otherwise rigid system.
In purely domestic regulatory schemes, this pattern is natural
enough. A legal standard such as the reasonable care standard in tort
law has the advantage of automatically updating, at least to some
degree, as society and technology changes. In the jury system, jury
members charged with applying the relevant standard will rely on
their own experiences to determine what level of care is reasonable.
In situations involving extraterritorial regulation, the question of
whether U.S. law applies extraterritorially in a particular fact
situation is typically treated as a question of law for the court.
209. See S.C. Res. 138, U.N. Doc. S/RES/138 (June 23, 1960) (requesting that
Israel pay Argentina reparations for Israel's abduction of Adolf Eichmann from
Argentinean territory).
210. Rainbow Warrior (Fr. v. N.Z.), 82 I.L.R. 499 (Fr. N.Z. Arb. 1990).
211. To be clear, this is intended as a detached observation on the realities of
quasi-military international "regulatory" efforts-not as a comment on desirability of
the regulatory methods employed.
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Accordingly, it is the court rather than the jury doing the balancing
when a statute is structured as a potentially extraterritorial
standard. In this situation, the legislature's decision to leave the
territorial scope of the statute as a standard is effectively a delegation
of authority to the courts.212 The court, taking account of numerous
different factors-including, according to some formulations of the
test, extremely broad factors such as "the importance of the
regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system" 213-can reach a decision as to whether the law applies
extraterritorially in the particular fact situation presented. 214
2. Discouraging Egregious Violations
The uncertainty inherent in standards may also serve as a way
of calibrating enforcement to the egregiousness of the potential
violation. As John Calfee and Richard Craswell have observed,
uncertainty in substantive legal standards should have predictable
effects on regulated parties' compliance decisions. 215
With most regulatory requirements, there is some inherent
uncertainty about whether noncompliant conduct will be noticed,
whether enforcement proceedings will be brought, and whether the
212. This does not quite seem to be a lawmaking authority (this is probably why
it has not been found to run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine); it seems instead-closer
to law-application authority tied to the specific facts of the case before the court. In
understanding this distinction between lawmaking and law-application authority, it is
important to remember the type of standard that is involved in decisions as to a
statute's territorial scope. These are typically complex, multifactor balancing tests
where the individual factors are assigned no level of priority and do not exhaust the set
of factors that can permissibly be considered by the court. In reaching decisions under
these tests, courts do sometimes make forward-looking statements that could appear to
set out the "law" and suggest fact situations that would test the future. However, the
very nature of these multifactor tests means that even a single factual change, if
sufficiently important, can change the outcome of the test.
213. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(e) (1987).
214. This seems to be part of the attraction of balancing to the Reagan-era State
Department. See Dam, supra note 151, at 376. In an April 1983 speech to the American
Society of International Law, then-Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam indicated:
We in the Department of State are not altogether satisfied with making a
balancing test the prerequisite to the existence of jurisdiction. As a practical
matter, however, a careful weighing of the interests of the states concerned is
obviously a useful procedure and a deterrent to unwarranted conflicts. We
welcome the Federal courts' use of a general balancing analysis in private cases
like Timberlane, Mannington Mills, and Mitsui. Balancing can certainly help to
ensure that decisions affecting significant foreign concerns are not taken
lightly.
Id.
215. John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1984).
230 [VOL. 46:171
JURISDICTIONAL STANDARDS (AND RULES)
proceeding will be successful. When the underlying substantive
requirement is structured as a standard rather than a rule, there is
an additional level of uncertainty tied to what level of conduct is
necessary to comply with the law.2 16 Under a standard, compliance
may not be a yes/no decision. Instead, it may be a decision as to how
far one should go along a spectrum that gradually shifts from definite
(but costly) compliance to definite noncompliance, with numerous
gray areas in between. The exact borderline may be unclear and
dependent in part on the identity of the court (or other decision
maker) that is later tasked with determining ex post whether past
actions were legal.
Assuming the potential defendants are sophisticated and advised
by counsel (an assumption that is likely fair in the antitrust or
securities fraud context), they should be expected to modify their ex
ante behavior in response to litigation risk. 217 This expected
modification of behavior intersects in an interesting manner with the
Craswell and Calfee model of uncertainty's effects on compliance
incentives.
The Craswell and Calfee model demonstrates that, at least in
certain situations, uncertainty as to the standard of care legally
required can induce regulated parties to under- or over-comply. 2 18
While Craswell and Calfee are interested in under- and over-
compliance with respect to the socially optimal level, the interest here
is not in the socially optimal level, but the level of compliance that the
regulating state prefers. To the extent the state, such as the United
States, has a relatively high level of regulation in a particular
substantive area, it may in fact prefer to overregulate foreign
competitors of its companies. 219
This reduced concern about overregulation may also increase the
value of standards as a regulatory mechanism. Recall from the earlier
discussion that rule-like regulatory actions and executive branch
enforcement decisions can serve as focal points for opposition by
foreign interest groups. 220 Moreover, executive branch enforcement
decisions are costly and require the government to divert resources
from other enforcement efforts. The outcomes of these actions are also
216. See Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and
Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 965
("Where the law is deliberately unclear, a corporation cannot know whether it must
[comply with a particular legal requirement] until a court rules.").
217. On the role of potential liability in influencing expected behavior, see
generally Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 357 (1984) (demonstrating that private liability and government enforcement
can have a similar effect on ex ante behavior).
218. Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Sanctions, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 279, 283-85 (1986).
219. See Muchmore, supra note 146, at 385-89.
220. See supra Part V.C.
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more uncertain than in many domestic enforcement actions. There is
an ever-present risk that a decision to pursue enforcement in a
relatively weak case can result in a precedent that could make it
more difficult for the government to pursue similar enforcement
actions in the future.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article has drawn on the jurisprudential dichotomy between
rules and standards as options for structuring legal requirements.
After surveying the existing literature, the Article suggested that
existing statutes can be better understood as falling into three
categories: extraterritorial rules, territorially limited rules, and
potentially extraterritorial standards. For the two, opposing varieties
of rule-like statutes, interpretive theories are largely irrelevant in
determining territorial scope. However, for statutes structured as
potentially extraterritorial standards, the choice of statutory
interpretation method has a strong influence on whether the court
applies the statute extraterritorially in a particular fact situation.
The Article then examined the puzzling persistence of standards
in the face of the desire for certain, predictable legal rules in
international business. It suggested that numerous parties involved
in the extraterritorial law-making process have reasons to prefer that
the territorial scope of extraterritorial statutes be structured as
standards. This could either be their first preference or a second-best
option when a favorable rule is not feasible. These incentive
structures suggest that standards may be part of the long-term
structure of an extraterritorial regulatory system, especially one that
incorporates private enforcement provisions.
Finally, the Article suggested that uncertainty about territorial
scope may have some underappreciated benefits-at least from the
perspective of the regulating state. It may provide a way of roughly
calibrating enforcement levels over time. Moreover, it may make it
possible to affect primary behavior in foreign countries even in cases
when an actual enforcement action is unlikely to be brought.
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